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Learning about Ability and the E¤ects of Pay Incentives
Raicho Bojilov
This dissertation studies how pay incentives interact with learning about ability
and labor turnover to shape the employment dynamics at a US call center. The rst
chapter provides an introduction to my work and summarizes my main results. The
second chapter o¤ers a descriptive analysis of the work environment, the production
process, and the e¤ects of pay incentives. The third chapter introduces learning about
ability and turnover in a model of e¤ort choice under moral hazard. This model is then
used to evaluate the e¤ects of changing pay incentives at the call center. The e¤ect of
incentives on e¤ort is signicant but small. The results indicate that turnover is a major
channel through which incentives a¤ect average performance. Simulating the estimated
model shows that neglecting learning and turnover makes estimates of the e¤ect of
incentives on e¤ort twice as big as they should be. The fourth chapter investigates
how considerations about the quality mix shape pay policy and prots. Building on the
estimation approach in chapter 3, the fourth chapter presents a two-step procedure that
is used to estimate a fully structural version of the model introduced in the previous
chapter. The results provide the basis for counterfactual policy analysis. The optimal
policy, in the class of linear contracts in output, not only induces employees to exert
e¤ort but also acts as a selection mechanism that helps the rm build a workforce of
high match quality over time. The results show that turnover is the major channel
through which pay incentives a¤ect prots.
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My dissertation studies how pay incentives, workers ability, experience, and turnover
shape the dynamics and outcomes of employment relations. I depart from the previous
literature that studies labor turnover and pay incentives separately for two reasons.
First, it is not possible to fully characterize the production process and work environ-
ment without explicitly modeling turnover. Second, pay incentives a¤ect prots and
workers welfare not only though e¤ort but also through the composition of the work
force at di¤erent tenure horizons.
In my empirical work, I use the personnel records of a US call center, which are
almost ideally suited for the purposes of estimating the e¤ect of incentives on perfor-
mance. The data set contains a clean measure of individual performance (dened as
output per hour), known compensation policies based on an hourly rate plus a bonus
rate proportionate to performance, and several changes in the compensation policies
that allow for the identication of the e¤ect of pay incentives on performance through
moral hazard and selection. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the organi-
zation of the production process, the technology, and the work environment. It also
presents an overview of the data set used throughout my work. A brief descriptive
2overview of performance and turnover from January 2005 to May 2006, the duration of
the observational period, shows that the employment dynamics is complicated and could
not be explained by a simple model of moral hazard. Then, I cut the data by monthly
tenure to provide an alternative descriptive analysis of performance and turnover. De-
spite some noise in the data, I conclude that pay incentives have a signicant e¤ect on
performance that is consistent with the predictions in the literature on moral hazard.
Furthermore, labor turnover is nonrandom: workers with higher past performance are
more likely to stay. I also nd evidence for unobserved heterogeneity among workers
that leads to persistent di¤erences in performance. Interestingly, performance does not
"fan out" as tenure increases. Finally, I observe that workers accumulate experience
during the rst 6 months that leads to an increase in their performance.
Next, I review the e¤ect of changes in the pay incentives on the quality of the
service provided by the call center. The monthly summary statistics indicate that the
total number of hours that employees work at the company does not vary with the
compensation policy. Moreover, employees record high scores on tests of the quality
of service; there is no bunching around the threshold of permissible quality and most
employees consistently score well above that threshold. Thus, I nd no evidence for a
trade-o¤ between quality and quantity in the context of the studied data. If anything,
there is a slight positive relation between number of successful calls and quality of
service.
A combination of nonparametric tests and some popular techniques in the related
literature allow me to identify some key features of the technology that generates the
performance signal. On the basis of these ndings, I estimate the observational equation
for performance. The results show that changing pay incentives has a signicant e¤ect
of e¤ort choice, that workers accumulate considerable experience during the rst ve to
six months on the job, and that there is unobserved heterogeneity that is not correlated
3with observed characteristics of the employees. These results are achieved without
explicitly modeling turnover and for this reason they are of little help in the analysis
of the unobserved variable(s) that generate persistent di¤erences in performance at
di¤erent tenure horizons. Without knowledge of the technology and the process that
generates turnover, one could say little about the e¤ect of changes in pay incentives
on prots and individual welfare.
Chapter 3 addresses these issues by modeling turnover explicitly. I consider a varia-
tion on the standard model of search by experience, rst introduced in Jovanovic (1979).
Each period, the workers choose not only whether to stay or quit, but also how much
e¤ort to exert. The crucial element in the model is an ability parameter that represents
the quality of the match between the employer and the employee. The parameter is un-
known at the time of hiring and the employee learns about its value over time through
a sequence of noisy performance signals. At the beginning of each period, the worker
draws an outside o¤er from a known distribution and decides to stay if the value of
continued employment is greater than the outside o¤er. If the worker decides to stay,
she chooses e¤ort that is not observable or veriable by the rm. Then she observes a
performance signal used for the update of her beliefs and is paid according to a linear
contract that depends on performance.
I observe that steeper incentives are associated with higher performance and that
persistent di¤erences in individual performance are driven by di¤erences in the quality
of the employer-employee match. Moreover, I nd evidence that employees learn about
the quality of the match in the course of the employment relation. Their posterior beliefs
are largely responsible for their decision to stay or quit. Researchers have recognized
that in such circumstances the distribution of characteristics in the workforce di¤er
from one period to the next. The solution to the resulting econometric challenges, it
has been suggested, is to limit empirical work to the subsample of employees who stay
4for the duration of the study. If one does so, the set of unobserved productivity e¤ects
remains the same over time and the e¤ect of changes to pay incentives is related to
changes in performance within each workers performance series.
One of my main results is that this solution, which I refer to as "the xed e¤ects
estimator," yields biased estimates when workers learn about their ability. At the core of
this nding lies the realization that employees decide to stay only if their posterior beliefs
are su¢ ciently optimisticwhich in turn implies that they must have been su¢ ciently
lucky in the realized signals. Then, the decision to stay provides information about
the noisy performance signals in the past. As an example, consider two workers, Alice
and Bob, who have identical ability but Alice receives a good signal in the rst period
and then a bad signal in the second period, while Bob receives a bad signal in the rst
period and then a good signal in the second period. When Alice and Bob know their
ability, the noisy signal does not a¤ect their decision to stay or quit at the end of the
rst period. However, when they learn about their ability, all other things equal, Alice
is more likely to stay than Bob because she entertains more"optimistic" beliefs. As a
result, the econometrician observes more Alices than Bobs, conditional on staying for at
least two periods. That is, the decision to stay imposes conditions on the performance
signal that relate performance noise in one period to performance noise in another.
The analysis of Chapter 2 shows that the data are consistent with a stochastic tech-
nology that is additively separable in e¤ort, tenure, and individual productivity. For
such a technology, I show how one can identify the e¤ect of Bayesian learning on per-
formance and turnover. The additivity of the technology plays a crucial role in building
and estimating a model of moral hazard and nonrandom attrition that nests as a special
case the hypothesis of Bayesian learning. The results indicate the presence of learning
about match quality but the proposed estimation approach allows me to obtain valid
estimates of the e¤ect of incentives on performance, recover the distribution of ability
5at di¤erent tenure horizons and characterize how these vary with pay incentives. They
also show that there is selective turnover, driven by pay incentives and learning about
ability. Furthermore, the e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort is signicant but small. Most
importantly, the results show that turnover is a major channel through which pay in-
centives a¤ect average performance and in turn prots. I also recover the distribution
of match quality at di¤erent tenure horizons across regimes, and characterize the dy-
namics of learning. Controlling for pay incentives, I nd that the employees of high
ability or those who believe to be of high ability are more likely to stay. As a result,
mean ability among those who stay increases with tenure. These ndings provide evi-
dence that ability is rm-specic and that the rm enjoys some monopsony power when
setting its compensation schedule. Finally, I simulate the model and nd that when
the xed e¤ects estimator is applied to the simulated data it overestimates the e¤ect
of incentives on e¤ort by a factor of three and the e¤ect of tenure on performance by a
factor of two.
Structural models of learning about ability are di¢ cult to estimate because the
econometrician needs to solve the dynamic program of each worker at each period for
each set of Bayesian beliefs. To reach the results in Chapter 3, I approximate the value
of continued employment rather than solve the set of functional equations within each
step of the MLE optimization algorithm. While simplifying the estimation, this ap-
proach also makes it possible to identify only changes in e¤ort that result from changes
in pay incentives. As a result, one cannot determine how much of the prots under a
given regime are due to e¤ort and how much to ability. Moreover, the results in Chap-
ter 3 do not provide the basis for counterfactual policy analysis. Chapter 4 proposes a
simple two-step procedure to estimate a structural model of pay incentives, Bayesian
learning, and labor turnover. The rst step is based on the approach presented in
the preceding Chapter 3: I estimate a semi-structural attrition model and recover the
6stochastic technology up to a constant, as well as a scaled version of the value of con-
tinued employment. I use these estimates in the second step to estimate the remaining
structural parameters using the method of moments. The results allow me to perform
counterfactual policy analysis and nd the optimal linear contract in performance. I
limit my search to linear contracts for two reasons. First, the rm whose personnel
records I use itself implemented such linear contracts and one of my objectives is to
characterize the protability of the rms compensation policies. Second, rms often
apply simple compensation policies based on such linear contracts and the problem of
nding and characterizing the optimal linear contract is of interest on its own.
The results show that most of the increase in prots from switching to the optimal
linear contract from hourly wage can be traced back to the e¤ect of incentives on the
quality mix. The optimal contract gives incentives to workers of high performance to
stay longer than workers of low performance and in this way it helps the rm improve
the quality mix of its workforce over time. This e¤ect more than o¤sets the loss asso-
ciated with replacing an experienced worker with a newly hired one of no experience
and unknown ability. Furthermore, the employer exploits the rm-specic nature of
match quality to capture most of the surplus generated by the employment relation.
To achieve that, the rm o¤ers pay incentives that induces little e¤ort, so high level of
e¤ort and low turnover are not necessarily attributes of the prot-maximizing pay pol-
icy. However, an exercise in comparative statics shows that as turnover costs grow, the
rm increases compensation to induce lower turnover by o¤ering much steeper incen-
tives. Given the strong evidence of high turnover costs in some industries, this nding
cautions that empirical studies of job mobility in the vein of Keane and Wolpin (1997)
should incorporate turnover costs as a crucial ingredient. Finally, another counterfac-
tual experiment shows that the rms prots would have been more than 25% higher if
match quality was known to the employees at the time of hiring due to self-select into
7the rm.
However, my work also su¤ers from some limitations. First, the personnel records
of the rm do not contain information about the employment history of workers before
and after their spell at the call center. For this reason, I could not evaluate the e¤ect of
their work at the call center on their career prospects and wage dynamics. Furthermore,
in Chapters 3 and 4 I make strong distributional assumptions of normality and restrict
the stochastic technology only to functions that are additive in ability, e¤ort, and
experience. The restrictions on the stochastic technology are motivated by the analysis
in Chapter 2 and the testable implications of the considered model in Chapter 3. Still,
the appropriateness of the distributional assumptions can be judged only on the basis
of postestimation tests, if at all. Finally, the theoretical and empirical problem of
nding the optimal contract in a model of moral hazard, labor mobility, and learning
about ability remains a topic for future research. In this context, the properties of
the optimal contracts from Chapter 4 likely depend heavily on the linearity of the
considered contracts.
The results reported here relate to several strands of the literature. Farber (1999)
provides a set of stylized facts about the US labor market. He points out that long-
term employment relations are common and that the probability of a job change declines
with tenure. At the same time, most new jobs end early and are the result of a job-to-
job transition, even sometimes with intervening spells of non-employment, by workers
in short-term jobs. The literature on labor mobility has almost exclusively focused
on long-term jobs, largely because researchers are restricted to using annual data while
short-term jobs last rarely more than a few years. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994)
describe employment dynamics at a large institutions o¤ering long-term jobs. Chapter
2 aims at doing the same for an institution o¤ering transitional employment.
My data set has two crucial advantages: it contains an individual-level objective
8measure of performance data and known compensation policies. In this respect it is
similar to the data sets used in Lazear (2000) and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005)
and faces similar challenges: in particular, how to distinguish between moral hazard and
adverse selection. To control for the e¤ect of nonrandom attrition on the characteristics
of the workforce at di¤erent tenure horizons, researchers have employed the xed e¤ects
estimator discussed above. My work shows that the results reported in them may
not be valid when labor turnover is driven by learning about ability. Moreover, in
Chapter 3 I show how one can estimate the e¤ect of pay incentives while controlling
for learning for a family of stochastic technologies. In the process of estimating the
model, I recover the tenure-performance prole across regimes. This result relates to
a large body of literature starting with the empirical ndings in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Yet, Abraham and Farber (1987) caution that the empirically observed
strong relation between tenure and earning in many cases is a statistical artifact due to
the positive relation between seniority and an omitted variable representing the quality
of the employer-employee match, job, or the worker. Since then a number of papers
have tried to identify the true e¤ect of tenure, match quality, and individual ability. I
also recover the distribution of ability and characterize the dynamics of learning which
are topics of a literature that can be traced back to the theoretical work on search by
inspection and wage rigidity in Jovanovic (1979) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982). As
with testing for moral hazard, the availability only of compensation data has posited a
major challenge to empirical work in the area. Chiappori, Salanié, and Valentin (1999)
overcome this challenge by exploring the testable implications of Bayesian learning and
downward rigidity on the dynamics of compensation series. Since turnover is close to
nonexistent in their data, their estimates do not su¤er from the econometric problems
discussed above. Yet, even the dynamics of compensation series are of limited help in
distinguishing between learning about match quality and learning-by-doing: Mortensen
9(1988) shows that learning about match quality and learning-by-doing impose the same
testable implications on the dynamics of compensation data, leading to insurmountable
identication problems to empirical work. For this reason, Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and
Parent (2005) are forced to assume away tenure e¤ects in order to estimate the quality
of industry-specic matching. Moreover, they do not take into account the structure
in the noise series that is introduced by conditioning on staying in the same rm or
industry for a certain period of time. In contrast, the availability of performance data
allows me to identify the functional form of the stochastic technology up to a constant,
which is crucial to distinguishing between tenure e¤ects of and learning about match
quality. To my knowledge, this is the rst work using observed productivity signals
to provide evidence for learning about match quality and characterize its dynamics, as
well as the distribution of ability at di¤erent tenure horizons.
Moral hazard ,on one hand, and Bayesian learning and labor turnover, on the other,
are subjects that are usually analyzed separately in the literature on structural esti-
mation. For example, Shearer (2004) and Shearer and Paarsch (2009) study the e¤ect
of incentives on performance and conduct a related policy analysis but the context of
their study allows them to assume away issues related to labor turnover. The presence
of turnover complicates the problem of nding the optimal contract. While in the stan-
dard moral hazard problem and in Shearer and Paarsch (2009) the base pay ensures
participation, in the presence of outside o¤ers an increase in the base pay increases the
chances of staying but decreases prots conditional on staying. Similarly, in a model of
learning about ability and turnover, steeper incentives induce more e¤ort and increase
the probability of staying but also cut in the rent extracted by the employer from the
rm-specic ability of the employees. Still, both moral hazard and labor turnover are
dening features of the analytical environment at most workplaces and their interaction
shapes employment outcomes and through them prots and individual welfare. The
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contribution, relative to Shearer and Paarsch (2009), is that optimal pay incentives are
allowed to a¤ect the composition of the workforce at di¤erent tenure horizons. Thus,
the chapter extends the work in Lazear (1998, 2000) on the e¤ect of incentives on the
quality mix by studying how turnover shapes the properties of the optimal pay policy.
The results show that turnover was the primary channel through which pay incentives
a¤ected prots at the call center. They also caution that models of equilibrium labor




The Employment Dynamics at a
Firm O¤ering Short Term Jobs
2.1 Introduction
The descriptive literature on labor mobility distinguishes two types of employment in
the US: long term jobs and short term jobs. Farber (1999) conducts a descriptive
analysis of the US labor markets on the basis of the annual NLSY, CPS, and PSID
data and o¤ers a number of stylized facts about labor mobility in the US. In contrast
to the prevailing opinion, he points out that long term employment relations are com-
mon. Furthermore, compensation grows with tenure, while the probability of separation
declines with it. At the same time, the American labor market is characterized by a
high level of job creation and job destruction. Farber (1999) argues that the two sets of
observations are not mutually exclusive because of three interrelated facts. First, most
new jobs end early within one to two years after which the probability of changing jobs
declines sharply. Second, most labor turnover is driven mainly by job-to-job transitions
and sometimes even by transitions to and from the pool of non-employment. Third,
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a large group of workers migrate from one short-term job to another short-term job.
Descriptive studies, such as Houseman (2001) and Abraham (1988) show that, depend-
ing on the industry, between 19% and 41% of all transitions from unemployment or
non-employment to employment follow a temporary to permanent job pattern. Autor
and Houseman (2005) document that temporary job agencies play an important role
in this type of transition. However, both temporary jobs and the role of temporary job
agencies, as Autor (2008) show are understudied and both the empirical and theoretical
mechanisms are little understood.
Despite their importance for understanding the dynamics of US labor markets, the
employment dynamics at rms o¤ering short term jobs is not well studied. In particu-
lar, the literature on labor mobility has focused on long-term jobs because most data
are annual while short-term jobs last rarely more than a few years. Baker, Gibbs, and
Holmstrom (1994) describe the employment dynamics and internal labor markets at a
large institution o¤ering long-term jobs. Yet, to my knowledge, there is no similar study
of the employment dynamics at an institution that o¤ers short term jobs. This chapter
tries to ll in this gap by describing the organization, production process, compensa-
tion, and turnover dynamics at a US call center. I relate my work to two prominent
frameworks for the analysis of employment relations. Their stylized predictions are
summarized below.
Within the context of the basic model of e¤ort choice in Lazear (1995 and 2000),
Lazear and Oyer (2010) present evidence for the empirical validity of the theoretical
predictions that (1) steeper incentives induce more e¤ort, leading to an increase in
observed performance; and that (2) steeper incentives lead to an increase in the vari-
ance of performance. With respect to the literature on search by inspection, Ericson
and Pakes (1999) develop a model of Bayesian learning under some very general as-
sumptions. The testable implications of the model, translated to the context of this
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study, are three: (3) average performance among those who stay increases as tenure
increases; (4) the probability of staying increases in past performance; and (5) under
some distributional assumptions, the probability of staying decreases with tenure if one
controls for posterior beliefs. I will focus on (1) to (4) in particular.
The call center collects debt on behalf of a major US cable TV company. It has a
simple hierarchical structure and the nature of its operations allows the management
to measure objectively both the productivity and the quality of service provided by
the employees. The rm does not use promotions or layo¤s to motivate or shape the
quality of its workforce. Instead, it relies on its compensation policy to do so. The
compensation policy itself is a simple type of a linear contract that depends only on
present performance. By rewarding high performance, it encourages top performers to
stay and low performers to quit. I also nd evidence for unobserved heterogeneity among
workers that leads to persistent di¤erences in performance. Furthermore, I nd that
labor turnover depends on past performance: workers with higher past performance are
more likely to stay. Interestingly, performance does not "fan out" as tenure increases.
In addition, I show that workers accumulate experience during the rst 6 months that
leads to an increase in their performance.
The data set also allows me to study how changes in pay incentives a¤ect the quality
of service provided by the employees. Employees score high on tests of the quality
of service, and there is no bunching around the permissible level of quality. Most
importantly the majority of the employees consistently score well above that threshold.
Thus, I nd no evidence for a trade-o¤ between quality and quantity in the context of
the studied data. If anything, I observe a slightly positive relation between the number
of successful calls and the quality of service.
A combination of nonparametric tests and some popular techniques in the related
literature allow me to identify key features of the technology that generate the perfor-
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mance signal. On the basis of these ndings, I estimate the observational equation for
performance. The results show that changing pay incentives has a signicant e¤ect of
e¤ort choice, that workers accumulate considerable experience during the rst ve to
six months on the job, and that there is unobserved heterogeneity that is not correlated
with the observed characteristics of the employees. These results are achieved without
explicitly modeling turnover. Precisely because of that, however, I also could not char-
acterize the unobserved variable(s) that generate persistent di¤erences in performance
at di¤erent tenure horizons. Without knowledge of the technology and the process that
generates turnover, one could say little about the e¤ect of changes in pay incentives
on prots and individual welfare.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the employment
environment and pay policy. After presenting the data set used in my work, it o¤ers
an overview of the operations of the call center. Section 2.2 also considers the e¤ect
of incentives on the quality of calls and presents some nonparametric tests for the
performance series. Section 2.3 presents some preliminary regression analysis that helps
me test for the e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort, for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity,
and the accumulation of experience. Section 2.4 concludes by relating my ndings to
the literature on moral hazard and search by inspection.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The data come from a call center in a large metropolitan area in the US with approxi-
mately 250 workstations. The call center collects debt on behalf of a major cable TV
company which places with the call center account information about customers with
outstanding balance prior to disconnecting their service. The operators both receive
inbound calls and make outbound calls to the customers. The records of the Bureau
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of Labor Statistics show that there is no other call center engaged in debt collection
in the metropolitan statistical area. The ownership of the call center changed in 2004
and, according to the new management, at the time of purchase, its operations were
characterized by very high turnover and low productivity (performance, from now on)
relative to the industry averages. As a result, the new management decided to switch
from hourly wage to a compensation policy that rewards high performance in order
to reduce turnover and improve average performance. In addition, the management
wanted to evaluate the e¤ects of pay incentives at one of its US call centers in order to
decide whether similar pay policy should be implemented at all of its call centers.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The rst subsection provides a
detailed review of the work environment, pay policies and production process. The
second subsection presents the main variables in the data set that I use in my work.
The third and fourth subsections o¤er descriptive analysis of the data by calendar month
and by tenure, respectively. The fth subsection shifts the focus on the relation between
quality of service and the number of calls that end with collection of the outstanding
debt. The sixth subsection presents briey the separation and hiring policies of the rm.
Finally, the seventh subsection presents some descriptive statistics and nonparametric
tests that impose restrictions on possible candidate specications for the stochastic
technology that generates the noisy performance signals.
2.2.1 Work Environment and Pay Policies
Employees worked in teams of approximately 15 call operators with one supervisor.
The supervisor had organizational and administrative duties, while the call operators
communicated with the clients of the cable TV company. More than 95% of all em-
ployees worked full time on daily shifts. On average full time employees worked for 191
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hours per month, which amounts to approximately 23 days of eight hour shifts every
month. The teams and supervisors varied with shifts. To my knowledge, in the studied
period the management did not follow any specic policy of allocating employees into
teams for its monthly work schedules. Employees did not have a permanent worksta-
tion: workstations varied with shifts. The arrangement of the workstations as well as
the composition of teams, remains unfortunately unknown for the purposes of my re-
search1. Only one worker handled a given call: therefore, the outcome of an interaction
with the clients of the cable TV company could be attributed denitively to a specic
employee. Clients were not allocated to specic call operators, but each time they were
randomly matched by an automatic switchboard. The inbound calls and the planned
outbound calls were added to a waiting list handled by the switchboard. Each time the
call on top of the waiting list was allocated to the longest waiting operator. More than
80% of all inbound calls were answered within 45 seconds.
A call was considered to be a success if the operator managed to persuade the client
to pay the outstanding balance on the account. The rm measured ones productivity
only by the number of calls that end with collection. In what follows, I will also accept
that this measure provides a noisy signal about ones productivity. The magnitude
and variability of client debts are crucial to evaluating the limitations of this measure
of productivity. Within this context, it is important to recall that cable TV services
are usually discontinued if a customer fails to pay for more than three months which
implies that the amount of money that call operators had to collect varied between $60
and $902, rarely exceeding $100. Most accounts were placed with the call center if the
client failed to pay for two consecutive months and denitely for three months, so in
1See Mas and Moretti (2008) for an empirical investigation of the e¤ects of learning from peers and
peer pressure on productivity.
2Most accounts were placed with the call center if the client failed to pay for two consecutive months
and denitely for three months. Thus, in most cases the outstanding debt was around $60.
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most cases the outstanding debt was around $60. As a result, the number of calls and
the total amount of collected debt are highly correlated, so that counting the calls that
end up with a payment of the balance appears to be an informative measure of ones
performance.
The rm o¤ered a detailed script to its operators for handling conversations with
clients, so that employees usually had some freedom to improvise only in the middle of a
conversation. In particular, the beginning and the end of the calls were heavily scripted.
For these reasons, the employees contribution to the outcome of a conversation was
largely limited to couching her accent, diction, the pitch of her voice, speed of talking
and so on to the context of her duties. The extend to which they succeed in doing so
depends largely on individual characteristics and social background, which could hardly
be explained by commonly observable individual characteristics, such as education, age,
gender, marital status, etc. Of course, one individual may make an e¤ort to alter a
property of her speech but she needs to be motivated somehow to do so.
In January 2005, the call center switched its compensation policy from an hourly
wage of approximately $9.5 to a at hourly wage plus a bonus proportionate to per-
formance. The new compensation policy, regime 1, stipulated a base pay of $3.8 per
hour and a bonus rate of $3.3 per successful call.3 Ones pay did not depend on the
performance of others; in theory there may be competition among the employees for
calls, but in practice this possibility was ruled out by a chronic shortage of workers at
the call center. Concerned that the company was paying "too much," the central man-
agement implemented regime 2, a variation on regime 1, for the newly-hired employees
in June 2005 . Relative to regime 1, regime 2 o¤ered both a lower base pay of $3.5
3Please note that in the interest of protecting the rms identity and trade secrets, here I report an
approximation of the rms policy by ignoring some stipulations for workers of low performance. In
practice, less than 5% of the employees under regime 1 were a¤ected by the omitted policy stipulations.
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per hour and lower bonus rate of only $2.8 per hour.4 . All previously hired employees
continued to be paid according to regime 1. Worried about possible negative e¤ects of
paying by the number of successful calls on the quality of the service, the central man-
agement changed the pay regime yet again in November 2005. Under the new regime 3
all employees were paid according to the pay schedule of regime 2. Furthermore, they
had to meet certain minimum quality standards of service to qualify for the bonus rate.
Twenty per cent of ones calls were randomly monitored and the quality of service was
rated on a scale from 0 to 100. For the monitored calls, the operator asked the client
at the end to answer some questions about the assistance o¤ered by the operator. The
supervisor applies a formula to the answers to grade the quality of provided service
on a scale from 0 to 100. The threshold level for acceptable service was set to 50. If
the monthly quality fell below the threshold, the worker was reduced to a at hourly
rate.5 Diagram 3.2 presents a time line for the implementation of the three regimes and
diagram 2.2 summarizes their pay schedules. Since 99% of performance lies between
1.05 and 3.8, regimes 2 and 3 e¤ectively lowered incentives relative to regime 1. All
regime changes were made by the central management and brought down to the call
center for implementation. I maintain in the rest of my work the assumption that all
changes in pay regimes are unexpected from the perspective of the employee. Since the
average tenure of employees hired after January 2005 is only 3.45 months, she may be
aware that a regime change is likely within several years but due to the expected short
stay would behave as if she was not aware.
4As previously discussed, here I omit stipulations of the rm for workers of low performance. In
addition, in the rest of the paper, I will ignore the following curious feature of regime 2: the bonus rate
was actually increased for those with performance higher than 3.8. However, since more than 95% of
performance lies below the 3.8 threshold level, in the rest of the text, particularly chapter 3, I proceed
under the assumption of a simple linear contract.
5The at hourly pay was similar to the hourly wage o¤ered before January 2005.
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2.2.2 Data
As part of its policy, the rm established a monitoring system that enabled it to record
the start, end, and outcome of each conversation, along with time on the premises
of the call center, actual time at ones workstation, waiting time between calls, and
time required to update the account records after the completion of a conversation.
Most data that I use in this and the following chapters are based on the aggregated
monthly records of the monitoring system. I combine these data with the monthly
compensation records of the employees and some basic individual characteristics from
the o¢ ce of human resources at the company. The result is a data set that contains 3675
observations for 659 individuals who were at some time employed by the call center. It
covers the period from January 2005 to May 2006. The following list presents the more
important variables that are available for at least some employees on a monthly basis,
along with some explanatory notes:
 Performance: average of the number of calls per hour that end with the collection
of the outstanding balance. This variable provides a noisy signal about ones pro-
ductivity and as such is the basis for the evaluation of the e¤ect of pay incentives.
It is available for all months.
 Idle time: total time (in hours) spent at ones workstation while waiting for a
call. This variable shows the utilization of employees by the rm and is available
for all months.
 Handle time: total time (in hours) that an employee spent talking with clients on
the phone.
 Wrap time: total time spent in updating the account records after a call. Thus,
wrap time provides a measure of the e¢ ciency of the monitoring system.
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 System time: system time is the sum of the preceding three types of time on the
premises of the call center.
 Break time: as the name suggests, this is the total time spent away from ones
station while on the premises of the call center.
 Total time: total time is equal to the sum of break time and system time; the
ratio of system time to total time gives a measure of the e¢ cient use of time by
the employee;
 Average payments: average hourly compensation in a given month that is based
on the implemented pay regime, 1, 2, or 3.
 Calls per hour: average number of calls that an employee services per hour. This
variable is available only for a sample of employees
 Average handle time: average handling time per hour (in seconds) that takes to an
employee to service a client. As regimes changes variation in these two variables
may provide evidence for perverse incentives. Again, this variable is available
only for a subsample of the employees.
 Quality assurance: percentage points received on monitored calls on a scale from
zero to 100. Quality assurance captures the e¤ect of the bonus rates on the quality
of service, so that it can shed some light on the trade-o¤ between quantity and
quality that the employees face. Measures of quality assurance are available only
for the time when regime 3 was implemented.
 Dummies for the implemented regime in a given month, as well as dummies for
the regime that was in place when an employee was originally hired.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for main variables.
Variable: Std. Dev.
Mean Overall Between Within Obs. Groups
Performance 3.05 0.68 0.53 0.42 3675 659
Pay from regimes 13.13 2.61 2.20 1.40 3675 659
Pay, total 13.69 2.25 1.63 1.55 3675 659
Tenure 6.65 4.61 3.49 3.01 3675 659
Full Time 0.95 0.23 0.22 0.07 3675 659
Separations 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.23 3675 659
Quits 0.08 0.28 0.20 0.20 3675 659
Layo¤s 0.02 0.16 0.11 0.12 3675 659
 Date of entry and date of exit, along with an indicator whether the employee quit
or was red.
 Individual characteristics, including age, gender, family status, race, and zip code.
 Full time employee or part time employee.
 Percentage of outbound calls.
I exclude part time workers from the analysis, who account for less than 5% of the
workforce. Furthermore, for econometric reasons I drop observations associated with
the second employment spell of 16 rehired employees.
Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics for the data set, dened as a panel data set
with employees ID and monthly tenure as its dimensions. The average performance
in the data set is 3.05 successful calls per hour, where successful call stands for a
call that ends with debt collection. Notably, the standard deviation of 0.53 across
employees contributes more to the overall standard deviation of performance than
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the within standard deviation of 0.42. Total pay is the sum of pay associated with the
implemented pay regimes and additional sources. The average hourly pay based only on
the pay regimes is $13.13 with a within standard deviation of 1.4 and between standard
deviation of 2.2. Thus, the top quartile of performers earn between $15 and $17 per
hour, a not trivial amount within the set of low-skilled jobs. In contrast, the bottom
quartile of performers earn between $10 and $11 per hour, so that the di¤erence in
pay of the top and bottom quartiles, assuming 40 hour work week, amounts to around
$240. The average of hourly total pay, including all sources of compensation, amounts
to $13.69. Thus, most of the compensation that workers receive is closely associated
with the implemented pay regimes.6 For this reason, I will assume that workers behave
as if their compensation is completely determined by the pay regimes. The average
tenure at the rm is 6.65 months, but some of this is due to a set of grandfathered
employees who were hired prior to January 2005. Again, between variation is higher
than the within variation. The table also shows that the average hazard rate is 0.11
of which 0.08 is due to voluntary separations and 0.02 to layo¤s. The contribution of
layo¤s under regime 1 is slightly above 0.02 and declines under regime 2 and 3 to below
0.02
2.2.3 Descriptive Analysis: Calendar Time
The announcement of the introduction of regime 1 was made in November 2004.
Following the news, considerable number of workers quit in November and December
2004; anecdotal evidence suggests that these workers had lower than the average produc-
tivity level. Accordingly, the set of workers who started under the pay-for-performance
scheme in January 2005 was self-selected. As illustrated on Figure 2.1, from January
6Total pay includes some legally stipulated benets. Since they do not form a large part of the
employees income, I follow the related literature in abstracting away their e¤ect on the workers
behavior.
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to June 2005, the average performance increased from 2.68 to 3.22 successful calls per
hour, while the monthly separation rate uctuated between 7% and 10% . The sepa-
ration rate may appear to be high, but relative to the average for 2004, approximately
25% every month, it actually declined considerably. The introduction of regime 2 in
June 2005 for the newly hired complicates the descriptive analysis of the data. Figure
2.2 shows that average performance for those hired under regime 2 remained always
more than 0.60 successful calls per hour below its counterpart for regime 1. However,
when one compares average performance under regime 2 in the rst month of its intro-
duction and average performance under regime 1 in January 2005, it appears that the
di¤erence in performance is reduced to only less than 0.25 calls per hour. These two
observations are reconciled by the slower rate of growth in average performance under
the new regime than the one under regime 1. Interestingly, while average performance
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for those hired under regime 3 is below the average performance for those hired under
regimes 1 and 2, it always shadows the latter within only 0.1 successful calls per hour.
That is, Figure 2.1 appears to suggest that relative to regime 2 the introduction of
quality control did not a¤ect the dynamics of average performance.
The dynamics of the separation rates over time, presented in Figure 2.2, indicates
that factors beyond the compensation policy of the rm, such as the local labor market
conditions and the transitional nature of the job of call operator, have an important
e¤ect on the decision to stay in the rm or quit. In addition, they also indicate clearly
that between June 2005 and May 2006 the monthly separation rate for workers hired
under regime 1 was on average only half of the monthly separation rate for workers hired
under regime 2, which amounted to a rate of 18% on average. Interestingly, the intro-
duction of regime 3 in November 2005 does not appear to a¤ect the di¤erences between
workers hired under regime 1 and regime 2 in both performance and separation rates.
Again, a comparison between the separation rate for workers hired under regime 2 and
for those hired under regime 3 shows that the two regimes appear to have a very similar
e¤ect on the workers decision to stay or quit. Figure 2.2 indicates that separation rates
across pay regimes peak in January 2005, May 2005, September 2005, January 2006,
and again in May 2006. The dynamics alerts to the possibility of seasonal uctuations
in turnover and the necessity to control for the e¤ect of cohorts or calendar time when
estimating the e¤ect of pay incentives on performance and separation decisions.
While there can be a number of theoretical explanations for the observed dynamics
of performance and separations, Figures 2.1 and Figures 2.2 indicate that a simple model
of moral hazard, without selective entry and turnover or accumulation of experience,
cannot explain the observed pattern: such a model implies that workers hired under
di¤erent pay regimes have identical economic behavior when they are subject to the
same pay incentives.
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2.2.4 Descriptive Analysis: Tenure
A closer look at the dynamics of performance of employees who stay at least 5 months
during the rst 5 months7 of their employment relation has some important impli-
cations for the unobserved heterogeneity and how it a¤ects productivity. Figure 2.3
presents the average performance of workers staying more than 5 months for months 2
to 5, conditional on their performance quartile in period 1. If there were no persistent
di¤erences in the productivity of employees, performance in months 2 to 5 would be
the same across the initial performance quartiles. This hypothesis is not supported by
the data: the workers in the top initial quartile consistently have higher performance
in periods 2 to 5 than their counterparts in the other three quartiles. Thus, Figure 2.3
suggests the presence of at least two unobserved "types" of employees with consistently
7The length of the considered period is limited to 5 months, since regime 2 lasted only 6 months.
26
Figure 2.3: Average performance in months 2 to 5 of workers who stay at least 5 months,
















Quartile 1 (bottom) Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 (top)
di¤erent levels of performance. Furthermore, average performance for each initial quar-
tile increases over time: the di¤erence in average performance in periods 1 and 5 is
statistically signicant at 5 %. Finally, performance does not seem to be "fanning out"
over time. If anything, the data appears to suggest that the average performance for
the lowest initial quartile actually converges over time to the levels of performance of
the other quartiles.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the separation rates under regimes 1 to 3. As expected,
the separation rate under regime 1 is lowest and the separation rate under regime
3 the highest. There also appears to be a noisy downward trend in the separation
rates as tenure increases. Figure 2.5 presents monthly performance for the rst ve
months of employees hired and operating under the same regime, who stay at least 5
months. If there were only incentives and no attrition on an unobserved productivity
parameter, performance under regime 1 would be consistently higher than performance
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under regimes 2 and 3. If there were only selective attrition and no e¤ect of incentives,
performance under regime 1 would have been consistently lower than the performance
under regime 2 and 3: if an employee stays more than 5 months under the less generous
regime 2 or 3, she must be really good at what she does. Figure 2.5 rejects both
hypotheses. Thus, it appears to lend support to the view that both incentives and
selective attrition are at work.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 investigate whether there are any systematic di¤erences in past
and present performance between the stayers and quitters. Figure 2.6 presents the
average past performance from period 1 to t-1 of the employees who decide to stay
and of the employees who decide to quit at the beginning of period t. In all but one
period, the average past performance of those who stay is higher than the average past
performance of those who quit. This nding is consistent with the view that individuals
decide to stay or quit on the basis of the value, or what they believe is the value, of
a productivity parameter that remains unobserved by the econometrician. Figure 2.7
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sheds some additional light on attrition. It suggests that employees who stay by the
beginning of period t + 1 have on average higher performance in period t than those
who quit by the beginning of period t + 1. In addition to corroborating the above
hypothesis, this nding suggests that there may be a negative correlation between the
productivity shock and the outside o¤er, which also leads to nonrandom attrition.
The evidence from gures 2.1 to 2.7 is purely suggestive: few of the discussed
phenomena are statistically signicant. Nevertheless, it implies the following set of
stylized facts about the data:
 Incentives pay has a signicant e¤ect that is consistent with the predictions in
the literature on moral hazard;
 Attrition is nonrandom: workers with higher past performance are more likely to
stay;
 There are at least two types of workers, high performers and low performers, but
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performance does not "fan out" as tenure increases;
 Workers accumulate experience during the rst 6 months that leads to an increase
in their performance.
2.2.5 Quality of Service
The number of calls that end up with collection of the outstanding debt is an important
but only one of many indicators of the production process at the call center. For
example, the cable TV company may be interested not only in collecting the outstanding
balance on its accounts but also in establishing rapport with its customers, so that they
do not switch to another provider in the future. If this is the case, the cable TV
company is likely to condition the revenue that the call center receives from processing
calls on some quality standards. As a result, the management of the call center would
also be interested in maintaining these standards. However, when workers are paid by
a at hourly rate and a bonus that depends only on the calls that end with collection,
the interests of the management and the call operators are not aligned. This type of
problems is at the core of the literature on multitasking and potentially explains why
piece rates are not common in many industries.
The empirical literature on pay incentives has not studied the problem of multitask-
ing, and in particular the relation between quality of output and quantity of output.
Shearer (2004) is based on experimental data from the operations of a tree-planting
company. The setting allows him to control the work environment but unfortunately
he does not focus on issues related to multitasking. Even in this very simple setting
there is a trade-o¤ between the quality of planting a tree and the number of trees that
are planted: in particular in relation to the depth of the hole prepared for the tree
and its positioning. The problem of multitasking is even more acute in the context of
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Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005, 2007): the care with which the worker picks each
soft fruit is crucial to the shelf life of the product, particularly if the fruits are perishable
as it appears to be the case. The authors, however, do not have access to data on how
the quality of the collected fruit varies with pay incentives. To my knowledge, Lazear
(2000) is the only paper that provides some anecdotal evidence for a small decrease in
the quality of windscreens after switching from hourly pay to a piece rate.
In contrast, the personnel records of the call center provide an opportunity to in-
vestigate how pay incentives a¤ect the quality of service o¤ered in each call. Recall
that the conversations are heavily scripted. For this reason, one way an operator may
try to cut corner is by cutting the conversation short. An employee would be tempted
to do so if it becomes clear to her that the person on the phone is not likely to pay.
Another way to cut corners is by reducing attentiveness, or by covering some points
slowly while omitting others altogether. Yet, after November 2005, the rm imple-
mented a quality standard which should have been able to detect both. It is important
to point out that relative to other professions, the call operators enjoyed greater exi-
bility of choosing their work schedule and the number of hours at work, even the full
time employees. This degree of freedom is evident from the high standard deviation
for the hours worked: between 86 and 96 hours for the di¤erent regimes. On average
employees worked 187 hours each month under regime 1, 196 hours under regime 2,
and 193 under regime 3. Thus, the changes in the compensation schedule do not ap-
pear to a¤ect hours worked in a spectacular fashion. Most importantly, the average
quality score between November 2005 and May 2006 is 85 out of 100, with a standard
deviation of 16. Furthermore, employees who have survived at least six months in the
rm have an average quality score of 89, with a standard deviation of 16.7, which is
not signicantly di¤erent from the average in the data. In fact, as tenure increases,
the average quality score increases from around 82 in the rst month of employment
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to 88 after ve months. The same growth pattern is observed even when conditioning
on staying for more than six months. However, the variance of the quality score does
not change with tenure. Moreover, these statistics indicate that most quality scores are
above the threshold level of 50. Consequently, they suggest that workers did not face a
trade o¤ between collecting debt and being polite or following the script o¤ered by the
rm. Thus, the pay policies of the rm, in contrast to the evidence provided in Lazear
(2000), do not appear to have negative side e¤ects.
2.2.6 Separations
As already discussed, the hierarchy structure of the rm was very simple. Ordinary
call operators could be promoted to the position of a supervisor, but since supervisors
last for years in the company, while call operators usually stay for several months,
this is a rare event. For this reason, in the rest of the text I maintain the simplifying
assumption that workers behave as if they have no chance of becoming supervisors. The
management of the rm also does not appear to use layo¤s as a selection mechanism:
the rate of layo¤s is 2%. The average layo¤s rate does not appear to vary with regimes:
it was 2% under regime 1 and then declined to 1.8% under regime 2 and regime 3.
Consequently, I conclude that the rm relies almost exclusively on its compensation
schedule to shape the quality mix of the workforce.
The call center hired employees after an interview with a group of supervisors and
members of the senior management. Vacant positions were advertised in the local
media. Upon entry, new employees went through a week and a half to two weeks
of training. In the rst couple of days they attended lectures related to their legal
obligations, got a tour of the premises, met future coworkers, and received a brieng
on the organization of the call center, and on their main duties and rights. Then
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they attended lectures whose purpose is to prepare them for their duties. During
the second week, new employees shadowed some experienced colleagues and gradually
started taking calls.
2.2.7 Signal Technology
In this subsection, I discuss the implications of some descriptive statistics and nonpara-
metric tests for the functional form of the technology. Figure 2.8 plots the hazard rate
for the workers who were hired and worked under regime 1 at least until nine months of
tenure at the call center. It shows that after the rst ve to six months the hazard rate
stabilizes around a rate of 6%. I take this hazard rate to represent the steady state of
job destruction which settles only after all transitional dynamics ends. Next, I consider
workers in periods 7 to 9 who experience a change in their pay incentives from regime 1
to regime 3. If all transitional dynamics has already ended , the only source of changes
in the distribution of performance will be the unexpected change in the compensation
schedule. Table 2.2 presents the means and standard deviations of performance before
and after the regime change, along with the probability of equal variance of perfor-
mance before and after. This probability is associated with the Levenes test for equal
variance, estimated with respect to the median. The switch from regime 1 to regime 3
induces a reduction in performance of between 0.05 calls per hour to 0.18 calls per hour.
However, as the table shows, the standard deviations of performance before and after
the change remain quite stable. Thus, the data do not appear to support one of the
stylized predictions of the empirical literature on moral hazard: that upon a change in
the compensation schedule the variance of the productivity signal also changes (in this
case, expected to decline). As noted in Lazear (2000), this stylized prediction depends
on the assumption that unobserved ability and e¤ort are complements. The results of
34
















Table 2.2 suggest that, while mean performance is sensitive to the change in pay, higher
moments are not. Such a data pattern is consistent with a stochastic technology that
is additive in e¤ort and unobserved ability.
Such a technology is also consistent with the test results reported in Table 2.3.
The table reports the means and standard deviations of performance under regime 1
for those workers who stayed for at least 9 months. Given the nding that workers
of high past performance tend to stay longer then workers of low performance, one
may conclude that those who stay for at least 9 months are top performers. This
observation is conrmed by a casual examination of their average monthly performance.
Conditioning on staying for at least 9 months is very similar to conditioning on having
consistently high performance or high unobserved ability to the extent to which it
drives persistent di¤erences in performance. For this set of workers, the variance of
performance does not appear to vary much with tenure, as indicated by the Levenes
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Table 2.2: Variance before and after switching from regime 1 to regime 3.
Variable: Regime 1 Regime 3 Prob(equal var)
Perf., t = 7 3.46 3.32
Std. dev. (Perf., t = 7) (0.61) (0.59) 0.81
Perf., t = 8 3.42 3.37
Std. dev. (Perf., t = 8) (0.62) (0.68) 0.78
Perf., t = 9 3.45 3.29
Std. dev. (Perf., t = 9) (0.55) (0.61) 0.28
Perf., t = 10 3.48 3.30
Std. dev. (Perf., t = 10) (0.60) (0.58) 0.58
test for equal variance at the bottom of the table.8 Thus, there seems to be no "fanning
out" of performance with tenure.
Next, I study how performance varies with pay incentives in the early months of
employment at the call center. Table 2.4 presents the Mann-Whitney test for equal
distribution of demeaned performance in the rst month of employment across regimes.
A casual look at the standard deviations of performance in period 1 under the di¤erent
regimes veries the plausibility of the hypothesis of equal variance: the standard devi-
ations vary between 0.45 and 0.47. This observation is conrmed by the results of the
Mann-Whitney tests for equality of the demeaned distributions of performance under
8The general formulation of the Levenes test for equal variances is as follows. Let there be k
subgroups and the sample size of subgroup i be Ni Let yij indicate the observation for individual j in
subgroup i.
Null: 21 = 
2
2 = ::: = 
2
k
Alternative: 2i 6= 2j for at least one pair (i,j)
The test statistic is distributed as F(k   1; N   k) and is dened as:
W =
(N   k)Pki=1Ni (Zi   Z)2
(k   1)Pki=1PNij=1 (Zij   Zi)2 ;
where:
Zij = jyij   yij
and Zi is the group mean of Zij for group i and Z is the overall mean for all Zij :
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Table 2.3: Meanf and standard deviation of performance for workers who stay at least
9 months.












Note: Observations in each months are 162.
regimes 1, 2, and 3 in the rst month: the tests fail to reject the hypothesis of equality
of the demeaned distributions across regimes. As Lazear and Oyer (2010) point out, a
change in pay incentives is likely to a¤ect the type of workers who enter a rm and as
a result alter the distributions of performance at entry across di¤erent regimes. Table
2.4, however, indicates that in the context of the call center such self-selection would
likely be restricted only to a shift in the distribution of performance. The question then
arises whether it would be possible to distinguish between selection and moral hazard
discussed in some detail in the following section and Chapter 3.
Finally, I return to the dynamics of performance as tenure increases. The following
table 2.5 presents the results from aMann-Whitney test for the following two conditions,
where y0t stand for the demeaned performance at t and a




y01js2 = 1; y01 > a0
 ' F  y01jy01 > a0
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Table 2.4: Mann-Whitney test for identical distributions of demeaned performance
across regimes at t=1.
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Std. Dev. 0.465 0.454 0.457
Regime 1 Pr=0.907 Pr=0.564
Regime 2 Pr=0.408





 ' F  y02jy01 > a0
Intuitively, these two conditions state that the demeaned distributions of perfor-
mance in the rst two months of employment must be equal to each other for the set
of people who observe such a good signal that they are almost surely going to stay.
For the test I consider a threshold of a = 0:5. I have performed the tests implied by
the conditions for a = 0:3, 0:4, 0:5, 0:6, and 0:7. The test results for a = 0:3 reject
the hypothesis for equal distribution, while for a = 0:4 the hypothesis is not rejected.
The sample size at a = 0:5 is slightly above 150, but it declines below 100 for a = 0:6
and a = 0:7. Consequently, while the hypothesis for equal distribution is not rejected
for a = 0:6 and a = 0:7, the small sample size cast some doubt on the results of the
nonparametric tests. The F- statistics for the Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the
null hypothesis of equal distributions is not rejected.
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Table 2.5: Mann-Whitney test for conditions 1 and 2 with a threshold of 0.5
Test: F-stat P-Value
Condition 1 0.12 0.91
Condition 2, stay  2 0.57 0.56
2.3 Regression Analysis
Let yit stand for performance of individual i in t, i for an individual e¤ect that is not
observed by the econometrician (ability from now on), lit for e¤ort, hit for accumulated
experience which may depend on past e¤ort or performance, Xit for a vector of other
observed individual characteristics, and "it for identical independently distributed
across tenure horizons and individuals random noise. Performance is potentially a
complicated function of past and present variables. One channel for such a dependence
is the accumulation of experience and another is the presence of learning about ability.
As indicated in Easley and Kiefer (1988) if workers learn about i in the course of the
employment relation, their beliefs about ability could a¤ect e¤ort choice and as a result,
performance in period t is likely to be a complicated function of all available information
up to period t: However, on the basis of the descriptive and nonparametric analysis of
the preceding section, I consider the following reduced form stochastic technology:
yit = i + f (Rit; t; Xit) + "it; (2.1)
where Rit is the pay regime assigned to worker i in period t: Accumulated experience
is modeled by orthogonal polynomials of order 2. Xit includes percentage outbound
calls, regime of hiring, race, gender, age, distance from home, and marital status.
I leave the formulation of the process that governs the separation decisions for the
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Table 2.6: Estimates for the observational equation in months 7 to 9 using xed and
random e¤ects for the subsample of employees who stay at least 9 months.
Dependent FE; t 2 [7; 9] FE; t 2 [7; 9] RE, t 2 [7; 9]
Variable: Perf. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
regime 3 -0.15 0.08 -0.15 0.08 -0.16 0.06
% outbound calls -0.13 0.09 -0.12 0.09 -0.10 0.07
Quit in t = 10 -0.02 0.24
Constant 3.42 0.55 3.47 0.54 3.38 0.49
Obs. 486 486 486
R2 0.67 0.67 .
Hausman test Prob(equal)=0.85
Note: RE also includes: gender, age, race, distance from home, marital status.
following two chapters. Here, I will follow an estimation approach that is popular in
the related literature. Specically, I estimate a xed e¤ects panel data model (xed
e¤ects estimator) for tenure between t1 and t2 on a subset of people who stay at least
t2 months in the rm. The performance equation includes the following explanatory
variables: second degree orthogonal polynomials of tenure and third degree polynomials
of calendar time, dummies for regimes of operation and regimes of hiring, as well as
controls. Both regime 2 and regime 3 are allowed to interact with tenure and other
observed variables.
I rst estimate the performance equation from above on the sample of workers
who started working under regime 1 and stayed at least 9 months in the rm. Figure
2.8 shows that the hazard rate attens after ve to six months. For this reason, I
estimate the performance equation only for tenure between 7 and 9, including. The basic
objective is to evaluate the e¤ect of changing incentives from regime 1 to regime 3 on
performance. I experiment with di¤erent specications for the orthogonal polynomials
of tenure but the preliminary regressions indicate that none of these specications
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Table 2.7: Estimates for the observational equation using xed and random e¤ects for
the subsample of employees who stay at least 9 months.
Dependent Variable: FE, Ti  9; t  9 FE, Ti  9; t  9 RE, Ti  9; t  9
Performance Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.39 0.11 -0.37 0.10 -0.35 0.10
t; orthog. pol. 2 0.23 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.19 0.09
regime 2 -0.24 0.15 -0.24 0.14 -0.25 0.12
regime 3 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.16
t: (r 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.86 0.43 0.87 0.43 0.79 0.39
t: (r 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.45 0.21 0.35 0.20 0.43 0.21
% outbound calls -0.13 0.07 -0.13 0.07 -0.14 0.07
Quit in t = 10 -0.07 0.21
Constant 2.66 0.45 2.85 0.45 2.87 0.42
Obs. 1080 1080 1080
R2 0.47 0.47 .
Hausman test Prob(equal)=0.72
Note: RE also includes gender, age, race, distance from home, marital status, and hiring
regime.
improve upon the following restricted version of the stochastic technology:
yit = i +
X
k
rkIRit=Rk +m (Xit) + "it; t = 7; 8; 9
where IRit=Rk is an indicator function equal to one when worker i in period t is paid
according to Rk and the coe¢ cient rk indicates the e¤ect of switching from the bench-
mark regime to regime Rk: In other words, by the seventh month on the job there
is no longer accumulation of experience. The results are reported in Table 2.6. The
rst specication includes not only the explanatory variables for performance but also
a lagged indicator of the decision of the worker to stay or quit in the tenth month of
employment. This is the formulation of a popular test for nonrandom attrition, initially
proposed in Nijman and Verbeek (1992). Under the null hypothesis of no attrition bias,
the coe¢ cient of this dummy variable is 0. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the
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Table 2.8: Estimates for the observational equation using xed e¤ects for the subsample
of employees who stay at least 9 months.
Dependent Variable: FE, Ti  6; t  6 FE, Ti  9; t  9 FE, Ti  9; t  9
Performance Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -13.78 1.52 -15.25 1.72 -0.39 0.11
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.65 0.82 0.55 0.98 0.23 0.09
r 2 -0.51 0.21 -0.18 0.25 -0.24 0.15
r 3 0.12 0.31 0.08 0.22 0.15 0.18
t: (r 2) ; orthog. pol. 1 2.91 5.24 0.08 6.53
t: (r 2) ; orthog. pol. 2 1.56 10.35 0.76 12.51
t: (r 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 2.81 0.33 0.82 0.56 0.86 0.43
t: (r 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.85 0.05 0.53 0.25 0.45 0.21
% outbound calls 0.15 0.07 -0.13 0.07 -0.13 0.07
Quit in t = 7 -0.28 0.09
Quit in t = 10 -0.08 0.21 -0.07 0.21
Constant 2.51 0.35 2.85 0.47 2.87 0.42
Obs. 1131 1080 1080
R2 0.45 0.47 0.47
Note: Specications also include orthogonal polynomials of calendar time.
estimates are not valid and attrition needs to be modelled explicitly. The coe¢ cient of
the lagged separation indicator is very close to zero and is not statistically signicant.
On the basis of this result, I conclude that the estimate of the e¤ect of regime 3 on
e¤ort, equal to a decline of 0.16 calls per hour, is valid. Thus, I nd evidence that
workers respond to pay incentives. I also estimate the performance equation using ran-
dom e¤ects. The estimates are similar to those previously reported. This observation is
conrmed by performing a Hausman test whose null hypothesis of no systematic di¤er-
ence between the xed and random e¤ects is not rejected at 5% signicance level. This
results implies that the unobserved e¤ect i is not correlated with any of the observable
explanatory variables. It is important because in the following chapters I will apply an
estimation approach that relies crucially on the assumption of that i is not correlated
with the observed variables.
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Unfortunately, the current specication of the technology does not allow for the
estimation of the e¤ect of tenure on performance. For this reason, I estimate the
technology (2.1) for 1  t  9 on those employees who stay for at least 9 months,
Ti  9; at the call center. The results from estimating this regression are reported in
Table 2.7. Figure 2.9 plots the tenureperformance prole for the average entering
employee conditional on staying for regimes 1 and 2. In what follows, I discuss the
xed e¤ects specication in the middle of Table 2.7. Regime 2 is restricted only to a
downward shift in performance across tenure horizons, while regime 3 is also interacted
with tenure. This specication is chosen after exploring di¤erent specications of the
relation between regime 2 and the orthogonal polynomials for tenure. The results from
these alternative specications are reported in Table 2.8. They show that none of
the interaction terms between regime 2 and the orthogonal polynomials is signicant.
The estimates indicate that the e¤ect of changing pay from regime 1 to regime 2
on performance is negative but not signicant. However, the e¤ect of regime 2 does
not di¤er signicantly from the e¤ect of regime 3. Switching from regime 1 to regime
2 leads to a decline in e¤ort that translates into 0.24 fewer calls per hour, which is
approximately 9% of the average initial performance under regime 1. In economic terms,
the change in incentives leads to a decline in workers hourly pay by approximately
$2.2, which is 27% of the average hourly pay in the rst month of employment under
regime 1.9 The results also report a signicant improvement in performance due to the
accumulation of experience: in the rst 6 months of employment performance increases
by approximately 1 call per hour, which translates under regime 1 into an increase in
hourly pay by approximately $2.5. Similarly to above, a Hausman test indicates that
there is no systematic di¤erence in the coe¢ cients obtained through xed e¤ects and
9Note that due to selection, the distribution of the unobserved e¤ect i is very likely not to be
normal and its distribution probably should be approximated by a mixture of normal distributions.
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Figure 2.9: Predicted performance - tenure prole for an employee of average ability

















Regime 1 Regime 2
those obtained through random e¤ects. Note that under the random e¤ects specication
the estimate for the e¤ect of regime 2 on performance is statistically signicant.
To summarize, the results above indicate the presence of an unobserved e¤ect that
leads to persistent di¤erences in performance across individuals. They also show that
pay incentives a¤ect performance through e¤ort choice. However, the use of a subsample
of the actual data makes it impossible to characterize the unobserved heterogeneity
that appears to drive most of the variation in observed performance. There is one
additional issue. Table 2.8 reports the estimates under the xed e¤ects estimator when
I condition on using only the observations of workers who stay for at least six months.
For that specication, the test for nonrandom attrition rejects the null hypothesis that
the coe¢ cient of the lagged separation indicator for t = 7 is equal to zero. This nding
is problematic. If the only potential source of attrition is some correlation between
noise in the performance equation and noise and the random part of the outside o¤er,
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then the xed e¤ects estimator should yield unbiased estimates for all cases reported
in Table 2.8. The fact that it does not indicates that there is an alternative source of
attrition bias. This is one of the topics studied in the following chapter.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides descriptive and regression analysis of employment dynamics at an
institution o¤ering short term jobs. I document that the rm does not rely on a complex
hierarchical structure to conduct its business. In contrast to the case of most long-term
jobs, its primary output is something that could be measured and the contribution of
each employee to prots established. Perhaps, in relation to these properties the rm
employs a simple compensation policy based on hourly pay and a bonus proportionate
to individual output. In contrast to institutions o¤ering long-term employment, the rm
does not use a system of promotions and layo¤s to shape the quality mix of the workforce
and motivate employees to work hard; it relies primarily on its compensation policy
to achieve these objectives. The management o¤ers steep pay incentives to achieve
this type of self-selection, which leads to a considerable heterogeneity in compensation
across employees. The descriptive analysis in this chapter veries that highly productive
employees stay longer in the company than employees of low productivity, which likely
contributes to the high turnover rate across compensation policies.
The employment dynamics at the company conforms with the main stylized predic-
tion in the literature on learning about match quality. Namely, expected performance
among stayers increases faster than individual expected performance. In addition, the
hazard rate for a given regime decreases with tenure and employees of high past perfor-
mance are more likely to stay than those of low past performance. At the same time,
I also nd evidence that pay incentives a¤ect performance and that performance in-
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creases with tenure. Still, there is no change in the variance of performance as incentives
vary, one of the two main predictions of the empirical literature on pay incentives. The
availability of a measure of the quality of ones work allows me to investigate whether a
compensation policy based on piece rates has negative side e¤ects on the quality of work
at the rm. The descriptive statistics suggest that this is not the case. To summarize,
the availability of detailed monthly data allows me to describe the dynamics of employ-
ment relations at a company that o¤ers short term jobs. Nevertheless, it is impossible
to evaluate the e¤ect of pay incentives on workerswelfare and prots without knowing
how incentives a¤ect the probability of staying in an environment of endemic turnover.
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Chapter 3
Estimating the E¤ects of Incentives
When Workers Learn about Their
Ability
3.1 Introduction
Learning about ability, turnover, and unobservable e¤ort choice are dening features
of many work environments. In a departure from the existing literature, I consider a
model of employment dynamics that incorporates all three. Using unique data from a
call center in North Carolina, I apply the model to investigate how learning about ability
a¤ects the empirical analysis of the e¤ect of incentives. Furthermore, the model allows
me to explore the channels through which pay incentives a¤ect average productivity
(performance) and in turn prots.
The data used in this study are ideally suited for the purposes of estimating the
e¤ect of incentives on performance; they contain an objective measure of individual
performance (dened as output per hour), a compensation policy based on piece rates,
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and variation in the pay policy. I observe that steeper incentives are associated with
higher performance and that persistent di¤erences in individual performance are driven
by di¤erences in ability, which reects the quality of the employer-employee match.
Moreover, I nd evidence that employees learn about the quality of the match in the
course of the employment relation. Their posterior beliefs are largely responsible for
their decision to stay or quit and the interaction between incentives and turnover ap-
pears to be crucial to evaluating the impact of incentives on individual welfare and
prots.
The fact that individual performance a¤ects labor turnover, while turnover deter-
mines what performance data are observed posits a serious econometric challenge. In
the absence of learning about ability, a popular approach to address this challenge is
to introduce individual xed e¤ects and estimate the observational equation on the
subsample of employees who stay for the duration of the study. If the set of unob-
served productivity e¤ects remains xed over time, it is then possible to estimate the
time-varying elements of the observational equation. This is the approach adopted in
Lazear (2000) and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) (hereafter BBR). I show that
this approach, referred to in the rest of the paper as the xed e¤ects estimator, is not
appropriate when workers learn about their ability. The main idea behind this result
can be illustrated by an example. Consider two workers, Alice and Bob, of identical
ability who observe a sequence of two identical productivity signals, a good and a bad
one. The di¤erence between them is that Alice receives the good signal rst, while
Bob receives the bad signal rst. Their payo¤ is equal to the realized signal and they
also can quit after the rst signal and accept the realization of a random o¤er that is
independent from the signals. When the two know their ability, their probabilities of
quitting after the rst signal are equal. However, when they learn about their ability,
Bob is more likely to quit than Alice. Thus, there are more Alices than Bobs
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among the workers who stay and changes in performance are driven by the decision to
stay or quit. A failure to control for this econometric implication of learning leads to
biased estimates.
Estimating the e¤ects of pay incentives when workers learn about their ability is hard
in general. However, if the stochastic technology is additively separable in e¤ort, tenure,
and individual productivity, I show how it can be done. These technology restrictions
play a crucial role in my empirical work: I use them to develop and estimate a model of
e¤ort choice and turnover that nests as a special case the hypothesis of learning about
ability. In this way, I obtain valid estimates of the e¤ects of incentives. Furthermore,
the estimation of the model allows me to recover the distribution of ability and trace
how it evolves over time and across di¤erent pay regimes. The bias from neglecting
Bayesian learning and attrition can be considerable: simulating the estimated model, I
show that the xed e¤ects estimator overestimates the e¤ect of incentives by a factor
of two.
My work contributes to several strands of the literature, most directly to the em-
pirical literature on pay incentives. The importance of pay incentives for performance
has been recognized at least since Taylor (1911). In the last two decades, McMillan,
Whalley, and Zhy (1989) provide evidence that 75% of the increase in agricultural
productivity in China from 1978 to 1984 can be attributed to the introduction of a
responsibility system which allows communes to retain some prots. Kahn and Sherer
(1990) document the wide spread use of pay incentives at white-collar o¢ ce jobs and
show that better evaluations are achieved by workers who face steeper incentives. Fer-
nie and Metcalf (1996) study how di¤erent forms of compensation a¤ect performance
among British jockeys and nd that the jockeys employed on xed compensation per-
form worse than those who receive prizes when they win. Finally, Lemieux, MacLeod,
and Parent (2009) nd that since the 1970s a growing proportion of US rms have
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conditioned pay on performance and that this development contributed to a growing
income inequality.
The availability of both performance data and a known compensation policy o¤ers a
number of advantages. Most importantly, researchers do not have to rely on strong as-
sumptions to form a link between observed compensation and unobserved performance;
knowing the compensation policy allows for a direct test for the e¤ect of pay incentives
on e¤ort based on observed performance. The research potential of personnel records
has been explored in a number of recent papers. Lazear (2000) considers the e¤ect
of switching from an hourly wage to a piece rate on the productivity of installers of
windshields. He shows that as a result of the change, average productivity increases by
35% . However, Lazear cautions that about one third of the change can be attributed to
selection at entry: the change in the pay regime attracted more qualied employees. To
control for the e¤ect of nonrandom attrition on the characteristics of the workforce at
di¤erent tenure horizons, he employs the xed e¤ects estimator discussed above. The
same estimator is also used in Lazear and Shaw (2009) that recovers monthly tenure-
performance proles. The xed e¤ects estimator is employed in Bandiera, Barankay,
and Rasul (2005) (hereafter BBR) where the authors study the interaction between
pay incentives and social preferences, BBR (2007) which considers the e¤ect of pay
incentives for managers on performance of subordinates, and BBR (2009) that analyzes
the e¤ect of pay incentives on team formation. In this context, the benets from the
experimental environment in Shearer and Paarsch (1999), Shearer (2004), and Shearer
and Paarsch (2009) become evident: control over the environment allows them to focus
exclusively on the e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort choice. Unfortunately, their framework
does not allow for the study of how turnover a¤ects prots. Moreover, economists
seldom can fully control the employment environment. My work contributes to the lit-
erature on incentives e¤ects in two ways. First, for a family of stochastic technologies,
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it shows how to estimate the e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort in the presence of learning
about ability and attrition. Second, while there is no evidence for selection at entry, the
results indicate that turnover is a major channel through which pay incentives a¤ect
average performance and in turn prots.
This chapter also relates to another strand of the empirical literature on learning
about match quality that can be traced back to the theoretical work on search by in-
spection and wage rigidity in Jovanovic (1979) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982). The
availability only of compensation data has posited a major challenge to related empiri-
cal work. Chiappori, Salanié, and Valentin (1999) address this problem by exploring the
testable implications of Bayesian learning and downward rigidity on the dynamics of
compensation series. Since turnover is close to nonexistent in their data, their estimates
do not su¤er from the econometric problems discussed here. Yet, even the dynamics of
compensation series are of limited help in distinguishing between learning about match
quality and learning-by-doing for a large number of models: Mortensen (1988) shows
that these forms of learning impose the same testable implications on the dynamics of
compensation data. This property caused insurmountable identication problems to
empirical work in the past.1 For example, in their paper Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and
Parent (2005) are forced to assume away tenure e¤ects in order to estimate the qual-
ity of industry-specic matching. Nagypal (2007) proposes an alternative approach to
identication based on estimating a structural model of learning-by-doing and learning
about match quality. However, she imposes very strong functional form restrictions
and abstracts away from incentive e¤ects. In contrast to the previous literature, the
availability of performance data, along with the modelling and estimation of learning
about ability and turnover, allows me to study key features of the stochastic technol-
ogy. As a result, in this chapter I can test for learning about ability, characterize its
1Nagypal (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the related literature since 1988.
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dynamics, and explore how pay incentives a¤ect the distribution of ability at di¤erent
tenure horizons. At any tenure horizon and controlling for pay incentives, I nd that
employees of high ability, or employees who believe to be of high ability, are more likely
to stay. Furthermore, mean ability among those who stay increases with tenure. These
ndings provide evidence that ability is rm-specic and knowledge about it does not
a¤ect compensation at alternative jobs. To my knowledge, this is the rst work using
observed productivity signals to provide evidence for learning about match quality and
to characterize the quality mix at di¤erent tenure horizons.
In the process of estimating the model, I also recover the returns to months of tenure.
This result relates to a large body of literature starting with the empirical ndings in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, Jovanovic and Mincer (1981) being one of the most
cited, of a large seniority or tenure e¤ect on earnings. Abraham and Farber (1987)
caution that the empirically observed strong relation between tenure and earnings in
many cases is a statistical artifact due to the positive relation between seniority and an
omitted variable. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) conrm the ndings in Abraham and
Farber (1987). However, Topel (1991) nds that a two-step rst di¤erence approach
applied to the same model and similar data yields substantially higher returns to tenure.
In a later work, Altonji and Williams (2005) review the strengths and weaknesses of
the applied methods and conclude that, if turnover is driven by learning about match
quality, Topel (1991) does not control adequately for attrition bias. In contrast to this
literature, I model explicitly the attrition process and estimate the e¤ect of monthly
tenure on performance2. Furthermore, I show that learning about ability still generates
a bias, as discussed in Abraham and Farber (1987), even when compensation is not a
function of past performance signals but a simple deterministic rule.
2Buchinsky et. al. (2009) rely purely on wage data to model expliticly turnover when it is gener-
ated through search by inspection, while preserving the structure of the observational equation as in
Abraham and Farber (1987).
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explores the implications
of learning about ability and attrition on the estimation of the e¤ect of incentives and of
returns to tenure. Section 3.3 presents the data used in the empirical work. Section 3.4
demonstrates how to estimate the e¤ects of incentives in the presence of learning and
nonrandom attrition. Section 3.5 presents the estimated e¤ects of incentives and tenure
under the xed e¤ects estimator and under the estimation approach of section 3.4. The
section continues with an investigation of the bias resulting from the inappropriate use
of the xed e¤ects estimator. It ends with a set of robustness checks that conrm the
choice of technology restrictions and the specication of the attrition process. Section
3.6 summarizes the main results and concludes with remarks on related research.
3.2 Bayesian Learning and Nonrandom Attrition
Labor turnover may depend on unobserved productivity parameters. Indeed, this is a
central feature of many models, starting with Jovanovic (1979). Such models predict
that workers with low values of the unobserved productivity parameters are more likely
to quit. If the econometrician ignores such a process of nonrandom attrition and pools
all available observations to estimate an equation for, say, performance, the estimated
e¤ects of tenure and incentives are biased. As pointed out in the introduction, past
research addresses this problem by estimating the observational equation using xed
e¤ects only on the subsample of employees who stay at the rm for the duration of
the study. In what follows, I will show that this xed e¤ects estimator yields biased
estimates when the workers engage in Bayesian learning about their ability. I discuss the
econometric implications of nonrandom attrition and learning in the context of a model
that incorporates both e¤ort choice and labor turnover. A central feature of the model
is the strong separability of the stochastic technology in e¤ort, ability, and tenure. This
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restriction is consistent with the properties of the data used in the empirical analysis,
and it emphasizes that in the presence of Bayesian learning, even when e¤ort choice
does not depend on posterior beliefs and ability can be di¤erenced out, the xed e¤ects
estimator yields biased estimates of the e¤ects of incentives.
When applied to the data generated by such a model, the xed e¤ects estimator
yields biased estimates because there is a nonzero correlation between noise in the per-
formance signal and the outside o¤er; this problem is well understood in the existing
literature on selection and attrition. Here I focus on the bias generated by learning
about ability and in the rest of the section maintain the assumption that noise in the
performance series and the outside o¤er are independent. If workers learn about their
ability only in the course of their employment relation, their separation decisions are
based on their posterior beliefs and through them on observed noisy signals. Conse-
quently, the decision to stay is not independent from noise in the performance series.
3.2.1 Model
The model is a variation on the standard model of search by experience, rst introduced
in Jovanovic (1979). Each period, workers choose not only whether to stay or quit, but
also how much e¤ort to exert. The crucial element in the model is a continuous ability
parameter i with a probability density function f. Ability is unknown at the time
of hiring and both workers and the employer observe noise signals about it in the
course of the employment relation. At the beginning of each period t, she observes
the realization of a continuous outside o¤er it that is independent of ability and has
a probability density function f :The worker decides to stay if the value of continued
employment is greater than the outside o¤er and quits otherwise. I assume that if an
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employee quits, she is never hired again.3 If the worker decides to stay, she chooses a
level of e¤ort lit, that is not observable or veriable by the rm.4 Then she observes a
performance signal yit governed by the following stochastic technology:5
yit = i + g (t) + lit + "it (3.1)
where "it is continuous, independent and identically distributed over time and across
individuals with a probability density function f", i is independent of the error process,
and g(t) represents the accumulation of rm-specic knowledge.6 The noise signal has
two roles in the model. On its basis, the worker updates her beliefs about i : the belief
at the beginning of t is denoted as it and depends on the initial prior i1 and the noisy
signals about i up to period t  1 including, fyik   g (k)  litgt 1k=1 : Beliefs are formed
in a Bayesian way and it has a probability density function fit :
The performance signal also provides the basis of compensation: the worker is paid
wit = it + ityit; according to a linear compensation regime Rit = (it; it)
0 : For the
purposes of future discussion, regime Rit is said to be more generous than regime R0it
, Rit > R0it; if both it > 
0
it and it > 
0
it: Workers are assumed to be risk-neutral
with a utility function
u (Rit; lit; t; i; "it) = it + it (i + g (t) + lit + "it)   (lit) ;
3This assumption is not restrictive to the empirical work in the second half of the paper: only ve
out of 675 employees are rehired after quitting. The second spells of employment are dropped out.
4See Malcomson and MacLeod (1992) for a discussion on the implications of these assumptions.
5Since both the actual and estimated performance are always greater that 0, the restriction yit  0
never binds.
6Jovanovic and Nyarko (1994) provide an alternative specication for the accumulation of rm-
specic knowledge, which is sometimes refered to as learning-by-doing. However, the data do not
support the prediction of their model that the variance of individual performance declines over time.
Note that the model also assumes that the accumulation of knowledge does not depend on past or
present e¤ort.
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where  (lit) is convex in e¤ort :7 The worker does not expect the compensation regime
to change in the future. In this way, I abstract away the issue of forming expectations,
which is outside the scope of this paper.8 Since i and lit enter additively in the utility
function, posterior beliefs do not depend on e¤ort and optimal e¤ort choice does not
depend on beliefs and is function only ofRit; l (Rit). On this basis, the value of continued
employment is dened as
H (it; Rit; t) =
Z Z
(u (Rit; t; i; "it) f" ("it) fit (it) d"itdit
+ 
Z Z






f (it+1jit; t) dit+1;
where f (it+1jit; t) is the conditional density of it+1:An employee decides to stay if
H (it; Rit; t) > 

it (3.2)
and quits otherwise. Consequently, performance for period T is observed only if (3.2)
holds for t = 1; :::; T: The assumptions of the model, the existence of a solution to
the workers problem and its characterization are presented in Appendix A. Under
assumptions 1-6 in the appendix, if Rit is more generous than R0it; then optimal e¤ort
l (Rit) > l (R
0
it) and H (it; Rit; t) > H (it; R
0
it; t) (and as a result the probability of
quitting under R0it is higher than the probability of quitting under Rit across it).
Furthermore, for a given regime the value of continued employment increases in it in
the sense of the likelihood ratio property.
7Prendergast (2002) discusses in great detail the relation between risk-aversion and optimal per-
formance pay. However, for the purposes of this paper, the investigation the e¤ect of a change in
incentives on e¤ort, the assumption of risk-neutrality is not restrictive.
8While at rst sight this assumption may appear restrictive, Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) show
that when rms learn about individual ability the existence of an outside option for workers disciplines
rms to keep piece rates xed even after beliefs are updated. This issue is discussed further in section
4.
56
Alternatively, the worker may know the value of her i at the time of hiring. This
is a special case of the model presented above, referred to in the rest of the paper as
the case of known ability. Here the prior belief is a degenerate distribution centered at
the true value. Performance in period T is observed if for all t = 1; :::; T
H (i; Rit; t) > 

it (3.3)
Again, ifRit is more generous thanR0it; optimal e¤ort l (Rit)> l (R
0
it) andH (i; Rit; t) >
H (i; R
0
it; t), while H (i; Rit; t) increases in i: While on the surface the two cases
appear very similar, they have very di¤erent econometric implications explored below.
The econometric implications of the interaction between learning about ability and
the decision to stay or quit are investigated in the context of this model. As presented
the model imposes that the outside o¤ers are drawn from a distribution that does
not change with tenure and does not depend on : These restrictions are imposed
for expositional purposes only: the econometric implications of learning about ability
do not depend on them and in fact the model that is taken to the data allows the
outside o¤er to depend on beliefs, tenure and other observed or unobserved individual
characteristics.9
3.2.2 Estimating the E¤ects of Tenure and of Incentives
Suppose for the moment that the principal interest of the econometrician lies in the
estimation of returns to tenure. Assume that the observational equation is dened by
(3.1) and that the piece rate remains the same across individuals and over time. In the
case of known ability, i knows i at the time of hiring and performance is observed in
9Mortensen (1988) discusses the additional assumptions on the process generating the outside o¤er
that are necessary to prove the existence of a solution and to characterize it.
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period T if (3.3) holds for t = 1; :::; T . If it is iid over time and is independent of the
error process for the observational equation, the decision to stay and the errors f"ikgT 1k=1










Thus, estimating (3.1) using xed e¤ects or rst di¤erences, subject to (3.3) for all
t = 1; ::; T , yields unbiased estimates of the e¤ect of tenure on performance in the rst
T periods.
Next, consider the case of Bayesian learning, in which i learns the value of i over










is generally di¤erent from zero. Since it is an increasing function of f"ikgt 1k=1 ;10 the
conditions for staying dene implicitly left truncations of the unconditional distribution
of "it: To illustrate, assume that the distribution of "it is log-concave. Then (3.4)
is positive and increases in min
n
fH (ik; Rik; k) + ikgTk=1
o
: Intuitively, for any i if
employee i stayed at least T periods, then in each period t before T she could not
have been excessively unlucky in her draws of "it: What "excessively" means depends
on the structural parameters of the model, in particular on i: Thus, estimating the
observational equation (3.1) using xed e¤ects or rst di¤erences, subject to (3.2) for
t = 1; :::; T yields biased estimates of the e¤ect of tenure on performance in the rst T
periods.
Diagram 3.1A illustrates the point that Bayesian learning imposes a left truncation
10More details can be found in Appendix A.
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on the distribution of observed signals for T = 2. For example, the fact that individual i
stays for at least 3 periods indicates that given i she must have been su¢ ciently lucky
in both the rst and second period. However, whether the conditional expectation
of noise for the rst period or the second period is larger depends on the structural
parameters of the model, in particular i. The former case is presented on Diagram
3.1B and the latter on Diagram 3.1C. Since the truncation thresholds decrease in i,
the "learning" bias declines with i. If for the majority of workers the conditional
expectation of noise in t = 1 is smaller than its counterpart in t = 2, as shown on Panel
C, then the xed e¤ects estimator overestimates the e¤ect of tenure on performance.
However, if the majority of the conditional expectations trend downwards as shown on
Panel B , the xed e¤ects estimator underestimates the e¤ect of tenure. Consequently,
the direction and magnitude of the "learning" bias depend in a complicated fashion on
tenure, ability; the realized errors, and the other structural parameters.
The analysis in the preceding paragraphs assumed that the compensation regime
does not vary over time or across individuals. In what follows, I relax this assumption
and discuss the econometric implications of learning within an example related to the
empirical context of my work. Suppose that regime 1 is more generous than regime 2,
and consider the case when the pay regimes are introduced sequentially, rst regime 1
and then regime 2; and suppose that i is known at the time of hiring. When workers
know their ability at entry, the xed e¤ects estimator again yields unbiased estimates of
the e¤ect of incentives, since the same set of workers are exposed to both pay regimes.
However, when Bayesian learning takes place, the estimated incentives e¤ect is biased
upwards, as illustrated on Diagram 1B. Suppose that a worker switches from regime
regime 1 to regime 2 in the second period and that the econometrician conditions on
staying for at least two periods. Since the employee stays for more than one period,
the conditional expectation of noise for t = 1 is positive, while for t = 2 it is zero. As
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a result, the xed e¤ects estimator overestimates the e¤ect of incentives. The same
argument extends to more than two periods. Suppose that beliefs converge to the true
value of i quickly and that regime 1 is in place during these crucial periods. Then, the
average of the conditional expectations of noise under the initial regime 1 is positive,
while under regime 2 close to zero.11
The preceding paragraphs indicate that the xed e¤ects estimator yields biased
estimates of both tenure and incentives e¤ect when posterior beliefs drive separation
decisions. This result follows from the fact that the noise from the signals a¤ect poste-
rior beliefs, which in turn determine individual actions, such as the decision to stay or
quit. At a higher level of generality, Bayesian learning introduces dependency on tenure
in the observed series of signals through the separation decisions. These observations
leave the econometrician with a choice to model attrition explicitly or to estimate the
treatment and tenure e¤ects on the set of agents who have a probability of quitting
close to zero. The rst approach utilizes all available data, but at the price of imposing
strong assumptions on the attrition and performance processes. In what follows, I adopt
the second approach and investigate the appropriateness of the associated assumptions
in section 5.4.
11Matters are complicated further by sample size and the horizon of the study. Convergence of beliefs
to the true value of the unobserved parameters is achieved for the model presented in this paper. Since
the issues is not central to the argument, no proofs are provided. An excellent treatment of the issue





Diagram 3.1: Implications of learning about ability for observed signals
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3.3 Data
A detailed exposition of the work environment, the local labor market, the descriptive
analysis of the data and some nonparametric tests can be found in Chapter 2. This
section reviews the aspects of the work environment and the descriptive analysis that
are particularly relevant to the scope of this chapter. The data set has several features
that make it comparable to the data sets used by Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, as
well as the data sets used by Lazear and Shaw. It contains a clean performance measure
and three piece rates that were implemented in a way that allows to identify each ones
e¤ect on performance. However, what makes it particularly appropriate for the study of
the interaction between learning and attrition is the presence of considerable turnover,
consistently above 50% during the rst six months of employment. The descriptive
analysis indicates that neither a pure moral hazard model nor a model of pure learning
about match quality can account for the observed data patterns.
3.3.1 Context
The data are collected at a call center in North Carolina owned and operated by a
multinational company. The call center collects outstanding debt and fees on behalf
of cable TV companies, which ensures a stable demand for its services. An automated
switchboard operator allocates inbound and outbound calls, so that the longest weight-
ing customer is matched with the longest weighting operator. Employees rotate their
work stations on a daily basis. In its recent history, the call center su¤ered from low
average productivity and high labor turnover.
As part of its reorganization plans, the central management implemented a an hourly
rate plus a piece rate (regime 1) as a pilot project to evaluate the consequences of
switching from hourly wage to a piece rate across all of its call centers. This regime
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change was implemented at the beginning of January 2005. The piece rate was a linear
function of the performance metric, the number of calls per hour that end with collection
of the outstanding debt. Importantly, ones pay did not depend on the performance
of others; in theory there may be competition among the employees for calls, but in
practice this possibility is ruled out by the chronic shortage of workers at the call
center. The rm experienced di¢ culties attracting candidates to ll in vacancies, so
the management hired virtually all candidates during its monthly hiring rounds. The
central management was concerned that the company was paying "too much," so it
implemented a new hourly rate and piece rate for the newly-hired employees in June
2005 (regime 2). Relative to regime 1, regime 2 o¤ered a lower base pay, decreased
the slope of the piece rate for those with performance less than 3.8 call per hour, and
increased the slope of the piece rate for those with performance greater than 3.8 call
per hour (regime 2). All previously hired employees continued to be paid according to
regime 1. Since the central management was worried about possible negative e¤ects of
the piece rate on the quality of service, it changed the pay regime yet again in November
2005. The new regime 3 had two components: all employees were paid according to
the pay schedule of regime 2, but in addition employees had to meet certain minimum
quality standards of service to qualify for the piece rate. Twenty per cent of ones calls
were randomly monitored and the quality of service was rated on a scale from 0 to
100. An employee who did not meet the minimum quality standard was relegated to
an hourly wage equal to the base pay of the piece rate. Since 99% of performance lies
between 1.05 and 3.8, regimes 2 and 3 e¤ectively lowered incentives relative to regime
1. Diagram 3.2 shows a time line for the implementation of the three regimes and Table
2 some descriptive statistics of interest.
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Diagram 3.2. Timeline of pay regimes.
3.3.2 Descriptive Analysis
The call center experienced high turnover rates under all pay regimes: more than 50%
of all employees under regime 1 quit within the rst six months of employment, while
under regimes 2 and 3 the turnover for the rst six months approached 67%. There also
appears to be a noisy downward trend in the separation rates as tenure increases. This
noisiness is probably due to the small sample size, but it also suggests that separation
decisions depend to a large extent on individual-specic factors. Table 3.1 reports the
average performance for the rst six months of employment across regimes. Again, as
one may expect, the average performance under regime 1 is higher than its counterparts
for regimes 2 and 3. Furthermore, the average performance on the subset of workers
who stay for at least six months is higher than the simple average, suggesting that poor
performers quit.
Figure 2.3 presents evidence for persistent di¤erences in performance across individ-
uals that are consistent with the existence of unobserved individual productivity e¤ects.
The gure plots average performance in periods 2 to 5 conditional on the performance
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the rst 6 months for workers who start and work
under the same regime.
Variable: Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
 (in $) 3.3 2.5 2.5
 (in $) 3.8 3.5 3.5
Avg. Perf. (call/hr.) 2.74 2.6 2.66
Std. Dev. (Perf.) 0.68 0.77 0.7
Avg. Perf., stay6 2.91 2.76 2.71
Std. Dev. (Perf., stay6) 0.65 0.67 0.6
Turnover 0.52 0.68 0.67
Obs., stay>6 113 59 9
quartile in the rst month of employment. If there were no persistent di¤erences in
the productivity of employees, performance in months 2 to 5 would be the same across
the initial performance quartiles. This hypothesis is not supported by the data: the
workers in the top initial quartile have consistently higher performance in periods 2 to 5
than their counterparts in the other three quartiles. Furthermore, average performance
for the employees in each initial quartile increases over time: for all quartiles, the dif-
ference between average performance in periods 1 and 5 is statistically signicant at 5
%. Finally, performance does not seem to be "fanning out" over time.
This evidence suggests that steep pay incentives lead to high performance; that
attrition appears to be nonrandom, since workers with higher performance are more
likely to stay; that individual-specic e¤ects are present, but performance does not
"fan out" over time; and nally that workers accumulate experience or knowledge in
the course of their rst six months of employment.
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3.4 Estimation
This section starts by introducing the attrition model taken to the data. One crucial
implication of the functional form restriction on the technology is that posterior beliefs
do not a¤ect e¤ort choice which simplies considerably the estimation of the e¤ects of
incentives. The rest of the section is devoted to presenting how to estimate the model
using MLE. The validity of the technology restriction is discussed in section 5.4.
3.4.1 Performance and Attrition Equations
The estimated model is derived from the theoretical model presented in section 2 with
a few modications: performance and the separation decision are allowed to depend on
m (Xit) ; a function of the individual characteristics observable at period t, Xit :
yit = i + l (Rit) + g (t) +m (Xit) + "it
Furthermore, I do not specify a utility function explicitly and approximate exibly a
normalized and scaled version ofH (it; t; Rit) ; G (it; t; Rit) = 1
 
H (it; t; Rit)  

;
where 2 is the variance of 

it and  the mean. This approach allows me to accom-
modate a number of variations on the basic model. For example, the outside o¤er may
be the sum of the random component it and a deterministic component that varies
with tenure, with some observed or unobserved individual variables or even beliefs.12
Without imposing structure on the utility function, it is possible to identify only the
e¤ect of a change in pay incentives relative to the benchmark regime 1; since one cannot
distinguish between e¤ort under the initial regime 1 and the mean of the distribution
of i: Furthermore, many parameters that determine the separation decision do not
12See Mortensen (1988) for a discussion of the conditions on a time-varying outside o¤er that ensure
a well-behaved solution of the workers problem.
66
have a clear interpretation in relation to the underlying model. Nevertheless, such a
specication is su¢ cient to test whether incentives a¤ect performance and to recover
the e¤ect of a change in incentives on the quality mix of employees at di¤erent tenure
horizons. As discussed in section 2, I also assume that employees take the piece rate
as given and do not expect it to change. Given that the average tenure at the rm is
around 3.5 months, an employee could have realistically expected that the same regime







The model is estimated under the following additional distributional assumption.




are iid across tenure horizons
and individuals, independent from the rest of the covariates. (ii) i  N (0; 2) is iid
across individuals and is independent from the rest of the covariates.
These assumptions impose strong restrictions: in particular, they rule out tempo-
rary but persistent health or family shocks. The plausibility of these assumptions is
evaluated in section 5.4 through some simple post-estimation tests. Under the assump-
tion above and if i1  N (0; 2), the posterior belief it is also normally distributed,
it  N (it; 2t ) for all t > 1; where





2 (t  1) + 2"
Kt =
2
2 (t  1) + 2"
Thus, Bayesian updating becomes quite tractable. In particular, the precision of beliefs
depends only on t, so the average of the demeaned past signals is a su¢ cient statistic
to characterize posterior beliefs. The formula for the posterior mean in (3.5) can be
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rewritten as






(yik   l (Rik)  g (k) m (Xik))
!
:
The function k (t) represents the precision that the worker attaches to the average
demeaned past performance as a signal about her : Since k (t) increases over time, she
attaches greater and greater weight to the average of the demeaned past performance
and less to the mean of the initial belief. Under the assumption of a common prior,
this discussion implies that the average of demeaned past performance is a su¢ cient
statistic for posterior beliefs and their e¤ect on the decision to stay or quit.
Thus, the model taken to the data is dened by the following sets of equations:
yit = i + l (Rit) + g (t) +m (Xit) + "it;
sik = 1
264G
0B@ik + (1  ) i| {z }eik ; Rik; k;Xik
1CA  ik > 0
375 (3.6)
where yit is observed if sik = 1 for all k = 1; :::; t: If  = 1; Bayesian learning is present
and employees share a common prior. If  = 0; workers know their ability at the time of
hiring. A  2 (0; 1) is di¢ cult to interpret, but probably suggests that the initial prior
is correlated with ability13; nally  < 0 is a clear rejection of the model. I estimate
the model under the restriction that  = 1; that  = 0; and when  is also estimated.
13I do not pursue this avenue any further because a nonparametric test discussed later indicates that
there is no self-selection at entry as regimes vary; the nding is consistent with the absence of any
prior knowlege about ability.
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3.4.2 MLE
The crucial di¤erence between attrition and selection models is that sit = 1 implies that
observing performance in one period implies that performance is observed also in all
preceding periods: Thus, sit = 1 provides information about the value of  that a¤ects
the estimation of yi across all observed periods: In contrast, selection models assume
that the selection process takes place in each period independently. The literature
on estimation of attrition models starts with Hausman and Wise (1979) who o¤er an
estimation method based on a full information MLE. The MLE method in this study
is similar, but also involves "integrating out" the unobserved e¤ects14. The derivation
of the likelihood is discussed in more detail in Appendix B. Here I provide only a
summary of the main features of the MLE.
Let the observable information about individual i be Wi and 1 be the vector of
parameters to be estimated conditional on i. The likelihood for individual i conditional


























sik and Ti is the last period in which i is observed. The interpretation
of this expression is quite intuitive. The individual observes a performance signal,
updates her belief, and decides whether to stay or quit. If she stays, the econometrician
14Florens, Heckman, Meghir, and Vytlacil (2008) provide the basis of an alternative approach based
on the use of control functions, which does not require distributional assumptions on the noise in
the performance signal. However, small sample size and the fact that the MLE ts the data well, as
discussed in the following section 6.2, argue in favor of the approach taken in the paper.
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observes her e¤ort choice and separation decisions in the following periods. If she quits,
the econometrician does not, so the unobserved performance and separation series are
"integrated out" and do not appear in the conditional ML. Since i is not observed,




where 2 is a vector of parameters that dene the distribution of i and  is a vector
that contains all parameters in 1 and 2 : Finally, the log-likelihood is obtained by









Note that the model of attrition with Bayesian learning also implies the exclusion re-
striction that the average of past performances enters the attrition but not performance
equations. Under alternative estimation methods, this restriction provides the basis for
identication.
3.5 Results
This section presents the results from estimating the model from section 2 and inves-
tigates some alternative specications. The empirical results are consistent with the
presence of Bayesian learning that leads to a considerable upward bias in the estimated
e¤ect of incentives and tenure on performance when the xed e¤ects estimator is used.
They also show that switching from regime 1 to regime 2 leads to a decline in e¤ort but
also to an improvement in expected ability among those who stay as tenure increases.
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3.5.1 Results for the Attrition Model
Tables 3.2 - 3.4 reports the results from estimating the attrition model by MLE. Model
1 is estimated under the restriction of known ability of match quality, or  = 0. Model 3
is estimated under the restriction of learning about ability or  = 1. Model 2 nests both
Models 1 and 3 as special cases and estimates . The performance equations under all
three models are the same: the explanatory variables include second degree orthogonal
polynomials of tenure and third degree polynomials of calendar time, dummies for
regimes of operation and regimes of hiring, and controls. Regime 2 enters additively as
implied by the theoretical model. Since regime 3 has the same pay schedule as regime
2 but conditions pay on the quality of service, the performance equation incorporates
interaction terms between the tenure polynomials and regime 3. The attrition equations
include third degree orthogonal polynomials interacted with regimes and, depending on
the specication, i or it; controls, calendar time, and regime of hiring.
The estimated  under Model 2 is 0.74 and is signicantly di¤erent from 0, but not
signicantly di¤erent from 1, which is consistent with the hypothesis of learning. A
likelihood ratio test fails to reject the restriction  = 1, while rejecting the restriction
 = 0. I take these results to imply that Bayesian learning is present and that Model
3 is the correct model. Accordingly, in what follows I discuss the estimated coe¢ cients
under the restriction of Bayesian learning. The variance of initial ability is 0.48 calls per
hour, signicantly di¤erent from 0, and accounts for the greater part of the variance
in performance in the rst months of employment. The variance of the disturbance
term in the performance equation is estimated at 0.17 which implies that the ratio of
the variance of match quality over the variance of noise is approximately 2.6 initially.
After 6 months the variance of the posterior beliefs declines to approximately 0.05 and
the weight that the worker puts on observed signals when forming her beliefs, k (t),
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of  under regimes 1, 2, and 3 at t = 3; 6; conditional on staying
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Figure 3.3: Increase in the importance of observed signals relative to the initial prior
























Coef. of  posterior mean Lower bound, 95% CI
Upper bound, 95% CI Theoretically predicted trajectory
approaches 1, as evident from Figure 3.3. The gure indicates that both the shape of
the trajectory is consistent with what theory predicts and the coe¢ cient is signicantly
di¤erent from zero at all tenure horizons. Furthermore, the correlation between "it and
it ceases to be signicantly di¤erent from zero when  is estimated or  is restricted to
be 1. The absence of a correlation implies that learning about ability is the likely cause
of any di¤erences between the estimates reported here and those obtained through the
xed e¤ects estimator.
In what follows, I discuss the two main channels through which pay incentives a¤ect
performance: e¤ort and the quality mix of the workforce. The model that is taken to
the data does not impose restrictions on the e¤ect of beliefs on the probability of
staying. Figure 3.1 presents the random truncations of the distribution of ability at
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di¤erent tenure horizons under regime 1.15 The value of  is on the horizontal axis,
while the vertical axis represents the proportion of agents of a certain match quality
who are present in the rm at a given tenure horizon. Ability is measured in calls
per hour. The gure shows that the conditional distribution of ability in a cohort of
employees shifts to the right as tenure increases: by 0.62 calls per hour within the
rst six months on the job. Most workers in the bottom quartile of the distribution
quit within the rst 2 months of entry in the rm, and most workers in the bottom
half of the distribution within 6 months. The gure suggests that only workers with
very high match quality face a low probability of quitting. This e¤ect of incentives is
equal to almost one standard deviation of ability in the population. Thus, the results
indicate that the data are consistent with an interpretation of i as the quality of the
employer-employee match.
Recall that relative to regime 1, regime 2 o¤ers less incentives to exert e¤ort and
lower base pay. Figure 3.2 explores how the change from regime 1 to regimes 2 and
3 a¤ects expected ability among staying employees at di¤erent tenure horizons. Since
regime 2 o¤ers both less incentives to exert e¤ort and lower base pay, the probability
of quitting increases across di¤erent types of ability. Yet, this increase is not uniform:
workers of low and average ability are more a¤ected than workers of high ability. As
a result, expected ability among the staying employees is 0.73 calls per hour after the
rst six months of employment, which is slightly more than one standard deviation of
the distribution of ability in the population. The quality mix after 6 months under
regime 2 is actually better than the quality mix under the more generous regime 1: this
nding suggests that the call center enjoys monopsony power and can capture much of
the increase in the production surplus that comes from an increase in ability. Together
15Here truncation of f(x) with lower limit a is dened as
R
a
f (x) dx. That is, one has removed
the part of the distribution less than a but not scaled up the distribution to integrate to one over its
domain.
74



















Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
with the nding that changes in pay incentives do not a¤ect the ability of entering
employees, these results provide evidence that ability is rm-specic: in particular, they
are consistent with the main testable implication of learning about match quality16 that
across regimes as the posterior mean and ability itself increase the probability of staying
increases.
Figure 3.2 also indicates that after three months at work, the di¤erence between the
distributions of ability under regimes 1 and 2 is smaller than the di¤erence between the
distributions of ability under regimes 1 and 2 after six months. This fact is consistent
with the dynamics of learning presented on Figure 3.3: most learning about ability
16See Ericson and Pakes (1999) for a model of learning about rm-specic productivity under very
general assumptions. The authors derive three main testable implications, outlined in chapter 2.
The results here are consistent with two of them; since I only approximate the value of continued
employment, I cannot test whether, controlling for the posterior mean, the probability of quitting
increases with tenure.
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Table 3.2: Estimates for the performance equation in the attrition model when ability
is known, when workers learn about it, and when the hypothesis of learning is tested.
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Performance  = 0  estimated  = 1
Explanatory Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.41 0.16 -0.56 0.15 -0.57 0.15
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.46 0.09 -0.62 0.09 -0.62 0.09
regime 2 -0.24 0.08 -0.19 0.07 -0.19 0.07
regime 3 0.23 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.08
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.88 0.13 0.77 0.13 0.78 0.13
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.53 0.09 0.43 0.08 0.43 0.08
% outbound calls -0.1 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05
Hired under regime 2 -0.11 0.08 -0.11 0.08 -0.10 0.08
Hired under regime 3 -0.36 0.29 -0.34 0.23 -0.34 0.23
Constant 3.59 0.11 3.43 0.11 3.43 0.11
Log-likelihood -3756.22 -3745.07 -3745.71
Notes: The specication includes calendar time, orthogonal polynomials of degree
3, and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and
race. Obs.=3,675
takes place within the rst six months on the job. That is, workers under both regimes
1 and 2 are willing to stay and learn about their ability during the rst months of
employment, but once they have learned their ability the e¤ect of the change in pay
incentives becomes larger. Figure 3.4 summarizes the di¤erences in expected ability
among stayers under regimes 1 and 2 at di¤erent tenure horizons.
Next, I discuss the estimates for the other channel through which incentives a¤ect
performance: e¤ort choice. Figure 3.5 plots the tenureperformance prole for the
average entering employee conditional on staying for regimes 1, 2, and 3. Regime 2
is restricted only to a downward shift in performance across tenure horizons, while
regime 3 is also interacted with tenure. The restrictions on the way regime 2 enters in
the performance equation follow directly from the restriction imposed on the stochastic
technology. The fact that the estimated trajectories of performance under regime 2 and
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Table 3.3: Estimates for the separation equation in the attrition model when ability is
known, when workers learn about it, and when the hypothesis of learning is tested.
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Decision to stay  = 0  estimated  = 1
Explanatory Variable: Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.44 0.18 -0.50 0.16 -0.50 0.17
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.19 0.08 -0.21 0.08 -0.21 0.08
t; orthog. pol. 3 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.13 0.23 0.13
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.52 0.16 0.41 0.14 0.41 0.14
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.45 0.11 0.40 0.11 0.41 0.11
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 3 -0.68 1.68 -0.78 1.57 -0.78 1.57
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.41 0.16 0.40 0.16 0.40 0.16
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.23 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.23 0.08
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 3 -0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.13
avg. % outbound calls in past -0.12 0.09 -0.29 0.09 -0.31 0.09
Hired under regime 2 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09
Hired under regime 3 -0.25 0.14 -0.25 0.13 -0.25 0.13
Constant 0.46 0.10 0.56 0.10 0.58 0.10
Log-likelihood -3756.22 -3745.07 -3745.71
Notes: The specication includes calendar time, orthogonal polynomials of degree .
3 and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and
race. Obs.=3,675
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Table 3.4: Estimates for ability and other structural parameters when ability is known,
when workers learn about it, and when the hypothesis of learning is tested.
Parameter or Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
explanatory variable  = 0  estimated  = 1
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
2" 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.01
2 1 1 1
 ("; ) 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04
2 0.49 0.02 0.48 0.02 0.48 0.02
 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.06
t:; orthog. pol. 1 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05
t:; orthog. pol. 2 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04
t:; orthog. pol. 3 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03
it 0.17 0.06 0.18 0.05
t:it; orthog. pol. 1 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03
t:it; orthog. pol. 2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
t:it; orthog. pol. 3 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
 0.74 0.29
Log-likelihood -3756.22 -3745.07 -3745.71
Notes: The specication includes calendar time, orthogonal polynomials of degree .
3 and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and
race. Obs.=3,675
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Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 3 Lower bound for 95% CI, regime 1
Upper bound for 95% CI, regime 1
3 are very similar is comforting because it suggests that workers did not practically face
a trade-o¤ between quantity of calls and quality of calls. Most importantly, the results
are consistent with the theoretical predictions of section 2: the e¤ect of changing pay
from regime 1 to regime 2 on performance is negative and signicant. However, the
e¤ect of regime 2 does not di¤er signicantly from the e¤ect of regime 3. Switching
from regime 1 to regime 2 leads to a decline in e¤ort that translates into 0.19 fewer calls
per hour, which is approximately 9% of the average initial performance under regime
1. In economic terms, the change in incentives leads to a decline in workers hourly
pay by approximately $2, which is 20% of the average hourly pay in the rst month of
employment under regime 1.
All models estimate a signicant improvement in performance over time due to
accumulation of experience: in the rst 6 months of employment performance increases
by approximately 0.67 calls per hour, or 23% growth in the rst six months under
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Figure 3.6: Comparison between the expected performance for stayers and the tenure


















E(perf), regime 1 E(perf), regime 2 E(perf), regime 3
Avg. perf, regime 1 Avg. perf, regime 2 Avg. perf., regime 3
regime 1. Under regime 1, this growth translates in an increase in hourly pay by
approximately $2.2. Finally, the dummies for regimes of hiring are not signicant,
which indicates that there is no self-selection into the rm on the basis of the pay
regime at the time of hiring.17 In combination with the estimated e¤ect of ability on
the probability of staying, this result indicates that the data are consistent with the
more restrictive model presented in section 2. Among the rest of the covariates, the
percentage of outbound calls has a negative e¤ect on performance and the average of
past percentages of outbound calls has a negative and signicant e¤ect on performance.
Women have on average lower performance than men, and marriage has a positive e¤ect
on performance but a negative e¤ect on the probability of staying.
17The test for selection at entry is the same as the one used in Lazear (2000). At least in principle,
the e¤ect of selection at entry may a¤ect not only the mean of the distribution of ; but also other
moments.
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Regime 1, theta=0 Regime 1, theta=0.69 Regime 1, theta=-0.69
Regime 2, theta=0 Regime 2, theta=0.69 Regime 2, theta=-0.69
Figure 3.6 presents the combined e¤ect of change in incentives on e¤ort and on
ability among stayers. The results indicate that the two e¤ects have di¤erent signs, so
that their sum amounts to a decrease in expected performance at t = 6 of only 0.1 call
per hour. At the same time, switching from regime 1 to regime 2 reduces compensation
costs of the rm considerably. With the possibility of hiring a replacement when an
employee quits, one may expect that the rm would be able to build a high quality
workforce under regime 2 whose expected performance will be similar or even better
than the one for t = 6 discussed above. This seemingly counterintuitive result is
consistent with the rm-specic nature of ability: since workers cannot export their
high ability to other jobs, the employer is in a position to gain much of the surplus
generated by the employment relation.
What is missing from this discussion on the protability of regimes 1 and 2 is the
e¤ect of the di¤erent regime on turnover. Figure 3.7 investigates how regimes 1 and
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2 a¤ect the probability of staying for employees of di¤erent abilities from the rst to
the sixth month of employment. Under both regimes 1 and 2, workers of low ability
leave the rm within the rst two months of employment. The greatest di¤erence is
in their e¤ect on the workers of average and high ability. Regime 2 practically forces
workers of mean ability to leave within the rst six months of employment. It also
reduces the number of high ability workers who stay, partly due to the e¤ect of bad
signals in the early stages of the employment relation. Figure 3.8 plots the probability
of quitting at tenure t = 6 as a function of the posterior mean. By the sixth month of
employment, workers have a much more precise beliefs about their ability than at the
time of entry and the accumulation of experience has already plateaued. Thus, one may
regard Figure 3.8 as an approximation to the state at which quitting behavior depends
on incentives and ability only. The gure shows that the impact of regimes 1 and 2 is
similar for workers in the tails of the distribution of ability and di¤ers greatly for those
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in between. Since workers of low ability would have already left, as indicated on Figure
3.7, the main impact of regime 2 relative to regime 1 is that it "weeds out" the workers
of average and slightly better than average ability. Moreover, the higher turnover rate
under regime 2 is also associated with greater destruction of accumulated experience
than under regime 1. These e¤ects are likely to limit the benet from improving the
ability among the long-term employees. Also, if they are high, turnover costs are likely
to o¤set the benets from improving the quality mix.
In short, the results indicate that not only e¤ort choice but also turnover is a major
channel through which incentives a¤ect expected performance and in turn prots. In
addition, they highlight the complexities associated with evaluating how protable a
regime is. The problem of evaluating the protability of the implemented regimes, as
well as the optimal compensation policy in the family of linear contracts in performance
is left for Chapter 4.
3.5.2 The Fixed E¤ects Estimator
This subsection presents a set of regression results that are obtained by applying the
xed e¤ects estimator to estimate the performance equation for the rst six months of
employment on the subsample of workers who stay at least six months in the rm. The
specication of the performance equation is identical to the one in the attrition model
from above. The estimates are very di¤erent from the ones discussed above which I
attribute to the presence of learning about ability. Another limitation of the estimator
is that it cannot be used to quantify the e¤ect of incentives on the quality mix.
Table 3.5 summarizes the results; it omits the estimates of parameters that are not
of direct interest to the discussion. Model 1 is estimated using xed e¤ects. Nijman
and Verbeek (1992) propose a simple test for nonrandom attrition which in the current
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Table 3.5: Estimates based on the xed e¤ects estimator.
Dependent Variable: FE estimator FE + attrition test
Performance Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -14.78 0.32 -15.25 0.32
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.61 0.18 -0.55 0.18
regime 2 -0.56 0.21 -0.58 0.21
regime 3 0.09 0.31 0.08 0.22
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 2.81 0.33 2.57 0.36
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.85 0.05 0.83 0.05
% outbound calls 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.07
Quit in t = 7 -0.28 0.09
Constant 1.71 0.35 1.62 0.35
Obs. 1131 1131
R2 0.45 0.46
Note: Model 1 is estimated on the set of workers who stay for at least six months.
Model 2 is the same as model 1 but also includes a dummy for the decision to stay
or quit at t=7.
setting involves the inclusion of a dummy for the separation decision of the agent at the
end of the sixth month. Under the null hypothesis of no attrition bias, the coe¢ cient of
this dummy variable is 0. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the estimates are not
valid and attrition needs to be modelled explicitly. The results from performing this
test are reported under Model 2. The estimates under Model 1 are in line with what
Lazear (2000) and Lazear and Shaw (2009) nd in a similar environment. Namely,
regimes 2 and 3 have a highly signicant negative e¤ect on performance relative to
regime 1. However, there does not appear to be a signicant di¤erence between the
levels of e¤ort under regime 2 and 3. Finally, the coe¢ cients of the tenure terms imply
signicant accumulation of experience during the rst 6 months of the employment
relation. The percentage of outbound calls has a positive e¤ect on performance: this
result is counterintuitive, since an employee is more likely to collect payment during
an inbound than during an outbound call. Most importantly, the estimated e¤ects of
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Figure 3.9: Performance-tenure prole at entry for i = 0 under regime 1 and 2:


















Regime 1, FE approach Regime 1, MLE Regime 2, FE appproach Regime 2, MLE
incentives on e¤ort and the e¤ect of accumulated experience are considerable larger
than their counterparts under the attrition model.
The dummy for quitting at the end of the sixth month has a highly signicant
negative e¤ect on performance, implying that the null hypothesis of no attrition bias
is soundly rejected. Intuitively, the negative coe¢ cient of the dummy variable implies
that individuals who do not stay for an extra period have lower performance than those
who stay. The rejection of the hypothesis of random attrition implies that the estimated
e¤ects of incentives and tenure on performance are biased for the reasons discussed in
section 2. The discrepancy between the estimates under the xed e¤ects estimator
and the ones reported in the preceding subsection suggests that neglecting the e¤ect of
Bayesian learning on turnover may lead to considerable bias in the estimated e¤ects of
incentives. This issue is investigated formally in the following subsection.
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Table 3.6: Simulation results showing the presence of attrition bias.
Variable True value Coef. Coef.
Avg. Std. Dev.
regime 2 -0.19 -0.57 0.18
regime 3 0.13 0.06 0.06
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.57 -14.89 0.29
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.62 -0.55 0.16
(t; orthog. pol. 1)*(regime 3) 0.78 2.78 0.31
(t; orthog. pol. 2)*(regime 3) 0.43 0.85 0.05
Note: The true parameters are equal to the estimated parameters under the
attrition model with learning, Model 3. The table reports the average of the
estimated coe¢ cients by the xed e¤ects estimator, along with the standard
deviation of the estimates.
3.5.3 Simulations
Section 2 establishes that if the e¤ect of Bayesian learning on nonrandom attrition is
ignored, the estimated e¤ect of incentives on performance and the tenure-performance
prole are biased. The crucial question is how large this bias is. One way to approach
the question is to estimate the bias using data simulated from the estimated model. In
what follows, I use this approach to evaluate the magnitude of the "learning" bias in
the context of the used data.
I simulate 1,000 data sets from the explanatory variables in the original data and
the estimated parameters of the model, Model 3 in Tables 3.2 - 3.4. In each simulated
data set, individuals enter at the calendar time of their actual entry in the rm, but
their quitting decision is endogenously determined by the simulated performance signals
and the piece rate of operation. The characteristics, and duration of piece rates in the
simulated data sets is exactly the same as in the original data set. For each individual
I draw 1,000 error paths and a  from the corresponding distributions, and with the
help of the estimated model parameters I generate the performance and separation
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series. If the econometrician estimates (3.1) subject to staying for at least 6 periods
using the xed e¤ects estimator, she overestimates considerably the e¤ect of incentives
and of tenure on performance. Table 3.6 reports the mean and the variance of the
estimated parameters. The results indicate that on average the xed e¤ects estimator
overestimates the e¤ect of switching from regime 1 to regime 2 on e¤ort by a factor of
two. The xed e¤ects estimator also overestimates the e¤ect of tenure on performance
by a similar magnitude. This last point is illustrated on Figure 3.10 which plots the
true and the estimated tenure-performance proles.
The channels through which Bayesian learning leads to the bias are complex. Under
regime 1, the true match quality of those who survive for the rst six months varies
widely. Many of the survivors under regime 1 have just been lucky, since in the following
months they quit. In contrast, under the less generous regime 2 and 3, only workers
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with  in the top quartile of the distribution of match quality survive. In what follows,
I will discuss how the average performance error varies across regimes and at di¤erent
tenure horizons, conditional on staying for at least 6 months at the rm. While the
average of the noise in the performance equations, conditional on staying, is positive and
increases in the rst three months under both regimes, its magnitude is considerably
larger under regime 1 due to the survival of individuals with low  under that regime.
Furthermore, there is a great heterogeneity in the observed performance-tenure proles
under regime 1 with low  being associated with steep proles. Given the additive
separability of equation (3.1), the estimated e¤ect of tenure on performance becomes
the demeaned weighted average of the performance-tenure proles across di¤erent 
and across di¤erent regimes. Since many more workers stay under regime 1 than under
regime 2 and 3, the estimated e¤ect of tenure is heavily inuenced by the average of
the conditional performance errors under regime 1. Thus, the di¤erences in the tenure-
performance proles under regimes 1, 2, and 3 nd their way into the estimated e¤ect
of di¤erences in pay incentives.
3.5.4 Robustness Checks
The model was estimated under a number of strong assumptions. In this subsection,
I perform some nonparametric test for consistency of the performance data with the
imposed restrictions on the stochastic technology. Then, I move to discuss some postes-
timation tests of the normality and independence assumptions that underlie the MLE
results. Finally, I consider several alternative specications for the attrition model.
Technology Tests
The model of section 2 is based on strong distributional and technology assumptions
which can be tested nonparametrically. The following observation presents one such
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nonparametric test.18
If workers start with a common prior and learn the quality of their match with the
employer over time, the distribution of match quality does not vary across di¤erent pay
regimes: each employee knows that the turnover after the rst period will be higher
under a less generous regime than under a more generous one, but at the time of hiring
everyone faces the same odds of staying more than one period. Since match quality
does not interact with e¤ort, only the mean of performance in the rst period varies
across regimes. That is, the distributions of performance across regimes are the same
up to a location parameter. Observation 1 states this argument formally.
Observation 1. Consider the model dened by (3.1) and (3.2) and suppose that the
workers share a common prior at the time of hiring. Then the demeaned distribution










for any R and R0; where y01 = y1   E (y1jR) :
Proof: Since e¤ort enters additively in the stochastic technology and optimal e¤ort
does not vary with i or it across i, the pay regime a¤ects only the rst moment of
the conditional distribution of performance. Furthermore, under the assumption of a
common prior belief at the time of hiring, the entry decision is not a¤ected by the pay
regime in place, so F (ijR) = F (). Therefore, F (y01jR) = F (y01jR0) :
The proof relies crucially on the assumption of common priors: if some workers
had a more accurate belief about the quality of the match than others, the probabil-
ity of staying more than one period will di¤er with beliefs leading to di¤erences in
the distribution of newly hired employees. For example, heterogeneity in priors arises
18In what follows, the subscript i is omitted where no confusion arises.
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when i stands for industry-specic rather than rm-specic match quality parameter.
Moreover, known ability at the time of hiring is a special case of heterogeneity in priors.
Thus, for single-peaked distributions with non-zero probability for every possible match
quality this property is also enough to distinguish between Bayesian learning with a
common prior and known ability.
Observation 1 imposes necessary restrictions on the observed performance series that
are strong. Tables 2.4 presents the results from testing for the technology restrictions
implied by Observation 1. A casual look at the standard deviations of performance
in period 1 under the di¤erent regimes veries the plausibility of the hypothesis of
equal variance: the standard deviations vary between 0.45 and 0.47. This observation
is conrmed by the results of the Mann-Whitney tests for equality of the demeaned
distributions of performance under regimes 1, 2, and 3 in the rst month: the tests fail
to reject the hypothesis of equality of the demeaned distributions across regimes.
Postestimation Tests and Alternative Specications
The estimation also relies on a number of additional assumptions; some of the more
important ones are the assumptions of normality and independence of the error terms in
the performance and attrition equations across individuals and tenure horizons. These
considerations provide the basis for a simple Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test for
the sum of match quality and noise in the rst month of employment, y01; where the
subindex indicates time, fails to reject the hypothesis of normality at the 5% signicance
level.
There are also a number of alternative specications for the attrition process. I have
explored these in the standard way and arrived at the attrition specication for the
observables reported here; it includes all controls, the interaction terms between beliefs
and tenure, as well as tenure and pay regime, but exclude second-order interactions, as
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Table 3.7: Estimates for the performance equation under alternative specications of
the attrition model.
Dependent Variable: Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Performance Heterogeneity Gen. form of No common
in o¤ers learning prior
Explanatory Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.55 0.15 -0.55 0.15 -0.59 0.15
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.61 0.09 -0.63 0.09 -0.63 0.09
regime 2 -0.21 0.07 -0.19 0.08 -0.24 0.07
regime 3 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.08
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.76 0.30 0.69 0.30 0.75 0.31
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.44 0.21
% outbound calls -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.04
Constant 3.73 0.20 3.85 0.18 3.54 0.19
Log-likelihood -3745.34 -3744.29 -3744.52
Notes: The specication includes calendar time, orthogonal polynomials of degree .
3 and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and
race. Obs.=3,675.
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Table 3.8: Estimates for the separation equation under alternative specications of the
attrition model.
Dependent Variable: Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Decision to stay Heterogeneity Gen. form of No common
in o¤ers learning prior
Explanatory Variable: Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.48 0.17 -0.51 0.17 -0.52 0.17
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.19 0.08 -0.23 0.08 -0.21 0.08
t; orthog. pol. 3 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.13
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.41 0.14 0.42 0.14 0.41 0.14
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.41 0.11 0.39 0.11 0.44 0.11
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 3 -0.79 1.57 -0.99 1.57 -0.78 1.57
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.40 0.16 0.43 0.16 0.38 0.16
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.21 0.08 0.25 0.08 0.23 0.08
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 3 -0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.14 -0.03 0.13
avg. % outbound calls in past -0.31 0.09 -0.27 0.10 -0.32 0.12
Hired under regime 2 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09
Hired under regime 3 -0.25 0.13 -0.25 0.13 -0.25 0.13
Constant 1.07 0.33 1.08 0.34 2.15 0.53
Log-likelihood -3745.34 -3744.29 -3744.52
Notes: The specication includes calendar time, orthogonal polynomials of degree .
3 and inidividual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and
race. Obs.=3,675
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Table 3.9: Estimates for ability and learning under alternative specications of the
attrition model.
Parameter or Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
explanatory variable Heterogeneity Gen. form of No common
in o¤ers learning prior
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
2" 0.17 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.17 0.01
 ("; ) 0.15 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04
2 0.48 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.48 0.02
it 0.17 0.04 0.22 0.05 0.16 0.05
t:it; orthog. pol. 1 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07
t:it; orthog. pol. 2 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06









t:i1; orthog. pol. 1 109.43 4316.80
t:i1; orthog. pol. 2 2609.56 1.065.10
5
Log-likelihood -3745.34 -3744.29 -3744.52
Notes: The specication includes calendar time, orthogonal polynomials of degree .
3 and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and
race. Obs.=3,675.
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well as quadratic terms. With respect to the tenure-varying independent variables, I
nd that the average percentage outbound calls in the past has the greatest e¤ect on
attrition among all functions of the lags of the percentage outbound calls. Furthermore,
I consider a number of alternatives to the proposed model of Bayesian learning.19 These
include a model under which Bayesian learning ends within 6 or 12 months of the start
of the employment relation; a more general form of dependence of the attrition equation
on past signals about , possibly adaptive learning; individual-specic heterogeneity in
outside o¤ers; and heterogeneity in prior beliefs at the beginning of the employment
relation.20 The results from estimating each of these alternative models are reported in
Tables 3.7 - 3.9 .
Model 4 in Tables 3.7-3.9 incorporates an additional heterogeneity term that enters
additively in the performance equation. It may represent a time-invariant individual-
specic heterogeneity in the outside o¤ers. Due to the presence of Bayesian learning, it
is assumed that this additional heterogeneity is independent of .21 The boundary 2
test indicates that the variance of this term is not signicantly di¤erent from zero at
the 1% signicance level, implying that the hypothesis of heterogeneity in outside o¤ers
is rejected. Similarly, Model 5 rejects the hypothesis that attrition depends on past
signals about  through a more general functional form than the simple average of past
signals. In particular, the model implies that agents do not assign disproportionately
large weight on recent signals when they decide to stay or quit. Due to computational
considerations, Model 5 incorporates only the last six signals starting from t   2 and
their coe¢ cients are estimated freely. The sign of the estimated coe¢ cients varies but is
19For example, workers may engage in adaptive learning or base beliefs on only the most recent
signals.
20Note that the possibility for heterogeneity in learning rates is ruled out by the nonparametric test
of Observation 2 that establishes that for the sub-sample of top performers performance does not vary
with tenure.
21Such an assumption may be justied when the outside option can be decomposed into two terms:
one that depends linearly on theta and one that is orthogonal to theta.
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never signicantly di¤erent from zero. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio test rejects the
hypothesis that Model 5 is signicantly di¤erent from the basic model. Finally, Model
6 allows for heterogeneity in the means of prior beliefs. This model is a special case of
a more general test for heterogeneity of priors that allows for both individual-specic
means and variance. The specication of Model 3 indicates that, while agents may not
share the same common prior, the precision of their initial beliefs remains the same
due to the rm-specic nature of the productivity parameter. In addition, I impose
the restriction that this individual-specic e¤ect is independent of . The estimated
variance of this e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent from zero, which suggests that the
assumption of a common prior is reasonable in the context of the study.
3.6 Conclusion and Related Research
This chapter demonstrates that neglecting the interaction between learning about abil-
ity and separation decisions leads to biased estimates of the e¤ect of incentives and
returns to monthly tenure. With the help of testable restrictions on the stochastic
technology, I estimate the e¤ect of incentives within a model for the employment dy-
namics at a call center in North Carolina that controls for the interaction between
learning and attrition. The results show that incentives induce workers of low and av-
erage ability to quit which, depending on the pay regime, leads in the rst 6 months
of employment to 24% and 31% increase in average performance for regimes 1 and 2
respectively. Furthermore, they show that growth in performance is primarily due to
quitting decisions and the accumulation of experience; the estimated e¤ect of incentives
is signicant but small. Simulating the estimated model, I nd that the xed e¤ects
estimator, popular in the existing literature, overestimates the e¤ect of incentives on
e¤ort by a factor of two and the e¤ect of tenure on performance by a similar magnitude.
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To the extent that learning about ability is likely in many environments22, the issues
discussed in this paper relate to a large body of empirical work in labor economics,
applied microeconomics, and industrial organization.
The model estimated in this chapter is semi-structural in the sense that it incorpo-
rates restrictions on the stochastic technology but does not specify a utility function.
The estimation of a fully structural model that species the workers utility explicitly is
the topic of the following Chapter 4. The main benet from performing such an exercise
is that the estimation of a fully structural model provides the basis for counterfactual
policy analysis. I study the problem of optimal pay within a model very similar to the
one considered in this paper; it incorporates e¤ort choice, labor turnover, and learning
about workers ability. The novelty, relative to Shearer and Paarsch (2009), is that
incentives a¤ect not only e¤ort choice, but also the composition of the workforce. The
structural model is estimated using a two-step procedure. In the rst step, I estimate
the attrition model as done in the present chapter and recover the stochastic technology
up to a constant, as well as a scaled version of the expected utility of continued em-
ployment. I use these estimates in the second step to estimate the remaining structural
parameters using the method of minimum distance estimation. The estimates are used
to nd and characterize the optimal linear contract in the performance signal. The
main result is that switching from hourly wage to the optimal linear contract has much
greater impact on prots through the e¤ect of incentives on turnover than through the
e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort choice. Thus, the companion paper shows that turnover is
a major channel through which pay incentives a¤ect prots.
22A number of studies, including Pakes and Ericson (1999), Chiappori, Salanié, and Valentin (1999),
and Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005), have found evidence that that observed data patterns
are consistent with Bayesian learning.
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3.7 Appendix A
Assumption 1. (i) Suppose that ability 23;  2 R; is time-invariant, continuous and
has a probability density function f. (ii) The outside o¤er t ; 

t 2 R; is continuous,
independent and identically distributed across tenure horizons t; where t = 1; 2; :::,
independent from ; and has a probability density function f :(iii). The noise in the
performance signal "t, "t 2 R; is continuous, independent and identically distributed
across tenure horizons t; independent from ; and has a probability density function
f":
Assumption 2. The performance signal yt is generated by the following technology:
yt =  + g (t) + lt + "t
where g (t) ; g (t) 2 R+; represents the accumulation of rm-specic knowledge or ex-
perience and lt is e¤ort, lt 2 L  R+, where L is compact. g (t) is increasing and
continuous.
Assumption 3. The belief at the beginning of t is denoted as t and is formed in a
Bayesian way. Let the initial prior be 1 and suppose that it has the same distribution
as :
Assumption 4. The worker is paid wt = t + tyt; according to a linear compen-
sation regime Rt = (t; t)
0 ; where t > 0 and t > 0: Regime Rt is said to be more
generous than regime R0t , Rt > R
0
t; if both t > 
0
t and t > 
0
t: The worker does not
expect the compensation regime to change in the future.
Assumption 5. Workers are assumed to be risk-neutral with a utility function
u (Rt; lt; t; ; "t) = t + t (i + g (t) + lt + "t)   (lt) ;
23In this section, I drop the individual subscript "i"
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where  (lt) is strictly convex, increasing in e¤ort, and  (0) = 0:






and i  N (; 2) :
I maintain assumption 6 because normality of "t; 

t ; and t is imposed on the models
taken to the data in Chapters 2 and 3. However, the statement of the optimal problem
of the worker, the proof of existence of a solution to the problem and its characterization
can be stated more generally. Without normality, in addition to assumptions 1 to 5,
one needs to impose that
Assumption 6(i) "t and  are log-concave, and (ii) the sequence of noisy sig-
nals about ability fyik   g (k) + likgtk=1 is ordered in the sense of the likelihood ratio
property.
Since  and lt enter additively in the utility function, posterior beliefs do not depend
on e¤ort and optimal e¤ort choice does not depend on beliefs and is function only of
Rt; l (Rt). The assumptions on the disutility of e¤ort imply the existence of a unique
interior solution to the problem of choosing optimal e¤ort. Furthermore, they imply
that as the bonus rate t increases, optimal e¤ort increases, too. By assumption 6 the
posterior belief it is normally distributed for all t > 1 : t  N (t; 2t ) ; where





2 (t  1) + 2"
Kt =
2
2 (t  1) + 2"
Note that precision of beliefs depends only on t, so the average of the demeaned past
signals is a su¢ cient statistic to characterize posterior beliefs. The posterior mean can
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be rewritten as






(yk   l (Rk)  g (k) m (Xk))
!
+ (1  k (t))
where k (t) = (t  1):Kt: By these observations, the independence of  from "t and t ;
and by the additivity of "t in the stochastic technology, the optimal problem of the
worker can be formulated as (P)
v (t; Rt; t) =
Z




















is the conditional density of t+1; given t and t.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 - 6:
i. The functional equation (P) has a unique continuous solution V (t; Rt; t) and
the optimal policy
A (t; Rt; t) = flt 2 L j (P ) holds.g
is a continuous function.
ii. Optimal e¤ort l(Rt) > l (R0t) if Rt > R
0
t:
iii. V (t; Rt; t) > V (t; Rt; t) if Rt > R
0
t; and V (t; Rt; t) increases t.
Proof of Proposition 1:





is continuous24, so the proof of existence is reduced to a problem which
24See Lemma 1 and 2 in Easley and Kiefer (1988) to establish proof of continuity of the transitional
kernel under Assumption 6and the more general formulation of the workers problem in Chapter 2,
Section 2.
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can be solved using Blackwell (1965). Dene the operator T by
(Tw) (t; Rt; t) =
Z
















Let C denote the set of bounded functions on P () : Under the supnorm metric, k:k;
C is a Banach space. By the contraction mapping theorem, a contraction operator
T : C ! C has a unique xed point and by Blackwells contraction mapping lemma, T
is a contraction if
(1). (Monotonicity) w1  w2 implies Tw1  Tw2 and
(2). (Discounting) there exists  2 (0; 1); such that T (w + c)  Tw+ c; for any
constant c  0.
Consequently, to prove existence it is su¢ cient to show that (i) the operator T is
a contraction and that (ii) T maps continuous bounded functions into the space of
continuous bounded functions, C.
(i). This result follows by establishing that conditions (1) and (2) of the Blackwells
contraction mapping lemma are satised. It is obvious that if w1  w2 uniformly; then
Tw1  Tw2: Furthermore, for discount factor 
T (w + c) =
Z
max[; t + t(it + g (t) + l (Rt))   l (Rt)
+ w
 

























= Tw + c
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(ii). As discussed above, the assumptions on the utility function and the production
technology imply that there is a unique interior solution to the problem of choosing
optimal e¤ort. Again, by the assumptions of the model expected utility in the current
period is continuous. Suppose that w(t+1; Rt; t+ 1) is continuous, then











is also continuous. The function max(a; b) is continuous if a and b are continuous, and
the integral over t is also continuous if 

t is continuous. Thus, T is a contraction that
maps bounded continuous functions into bounded continuous functions. The proofs
of (i) and (ii) imply that a unique solution V (t; Rt; t) exists. By the theorem of the
maximum, the optimal policy correspondence A (t; Rt; t) is upper-hemicontinuous, and
since the utility is concave in lt; the optimal policy is a continuous function.
Part (ii). The absence of interaction between e¤ort and beliefs makes the problem
of choosing optimal e¤ort static. Since the utility function obeys increasing di¤erences
in (; lt) ; optimal e¤ort l(Rt) > l (R0t) if Rt > R
0
t:
Part (iii). Suppose that Rt > R0t and V
 









Since t does not depend on Rt; and l (Rt) > l (R
0
t) ; the rst part of the statement
follows: Finally, suppose that V (t+1; Rt; t+ 1) increases in t+1 ; then, the integral of
V (t+1; Rt; t+1) over the distribution of t+1 conditional on t and t is also increasing
in t because the conditional distributions of t+1 are ordered in the sense of the
likelihood ratio property with respect to t. Similarly, expected utility for the current




Let the joint distribution of Yit = (yi1; :::; yit) and Sit = (si1; :::; sit) ; conditional
on Mi = (Mi1; :::;Mit) ; Mit = (Rit; t; Xit; it) ; i; and parameters 1; be given by
F (Yit; SitjMi; i;1) : By the denition of conditional distribution:
f (Yit; SitjMi; i;1)
= ft (sitjyit; Yit 1; Sit 1;Mi; i;1) :ft (yitjYit 1; Sit 1;Mi; i;1) :f (Yit 1; Sit 1;Mi; i;1)
Assumption 7 below plays a crucial role in deriving the likelihood and is justied by
the model presented above.
Assumption 7. Dynamic Completeness Suppose that
ft (yitjYit 1; Sit 1;Mi; i;1) = ft (yitjMit; i;1)
ft (sitjYit; Sit 1;Mi; i;1) = ft (sitjMit; i;1) :
By Assumption 7, the conditional density becomes:
f (Yit; SitjMi; i;1)
= ft (sitjYit;Mit; i;1) :ft (yitjMit; i;1) :ft 1 (sitjYit 1;Mit 1; i;1) :





[f (sikjYik;Mik; i;1) f (yikjMik; i;1)]
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To save on notation, the MLE is developed for the case when  = 0: If sit = 1; then




[Pr (sik = 1jYik;Mik; i;1) f (yikjMik; i;1)]
where
Pr (sik = 1jYik;Mik; i;1) =  (G (Rik; k;Xik; ik + (1  )i))




yik   g (Wik; k)  i


If sit = 0; while sit 1 = 1; then the unobserved yit must be integrated out, leading
to:
f (Yit; Sit = (1; :::1; 0)
0jMi; i;1)
= Pr (sit = 0jYit 1;Mit; i;1)
t 1Y
k=1
[Pr (sik = 1jYit 1;Mik; i;1) f (yikjMik; i;1)] ; t  2
where
Pr (sit = 0jYit 1;Mit; i;1) = 1   (G (Rik; k;Xik; ik + (1  ) i))
Pr (sik = 1jYik 1;Mik; i;1) =  (G (Rik; k;Xik; ik + (1  ) i))

















yit   g (t) m (Xit)  l (Rit)  i

















li (1jWi; i) :'(ijWi;2)di;
where 2 is a vector of parameters that govern the distribution of i and  is a vector








log li (jWi) :
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Chapter 4
Incentives to Work or Incentives to
Quit?
4.1 Introduction
Pay incentives a¤ect prots not only through their impact on e¤ort choice but also
through their e¤ect on the quality mix of the workforce. In this chapter, I investigate
the relative importance of these two channels to maximizing prots in a structural
model of employment dynamics that includes e¤ort choice, learning about match qual-
ity, and labor turnover. My empirical analysis focuses on contracts that are linear in
output: compensation is equal to the sum of a base pay and a bonus proportional to
hourly output (performance from now on). I limit my attention to this class of linear
contracts for two reasons. First, the rm whose personnel records I use itself imple-
mented such linear contracts and one of the objectives of this chapter is to characterize
the protability of the rms compensation policies. Second, rms often apply simple
compensation policies based on such linear contracts and the problem of nding and
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characterizing the optimal linear contract is of interest on its own. 1
The rms data are ideally suited for the empirical analysis of pay incentives; they
come from a call center in North Carolina and contain an objective measure of indi-
vidual performance (dened as output per hour), a known compensation policy based
on linear contracts in performance, and a variation in the pay policies that does not
depend on what the rm learns about its employees. My estimates show that steeper
incentives are associated with higher performance, that persistent di¤erences in indi-
vidual performance are driven by di¤erences in the quality of the employer-employee
match, and that employees learn about the quality of the match on the job. Their
posterior beliefs are largely responsible for their decision to stay or quit and the inter-
action between incentives and turnover appears to be crucial to evaluating the impact
of pay incentives on prots. Thus, I conclude that nding the optimal pay policy re-
quires the explicit modelling of all three: e¤ort choice, learning about match quality,
and separation decisions.
Unobserved e¤ort, labor turnover and learning about match quality are the subject
of intensive study in the structural literature but usually separately from one another.
For example, Shearer and Paarsch (2009) analyze the e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort and
conduct a related policy analysis, but the experimental design of their study does not
allow them to analyze the e¤ects of incentives on the pool of entering employees and
turnover. However, Lazear (2000) points out that in the context of his study about
one-third of the improvement in performance after the introduction of pay incentives
can be traced back to the improvement in the quality mix of entering employees. When
the quality of the match between a potential employee and the rm becomes known
1Within a dynamic setting as the one in this paper, the rms exibility in designing the contract
is reduced. This general idea is rst explored by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) who show that
in some settings the optimal compensation is to provide workers with incentives that are linear in
output. Besides, the cost of implementing a complicated nonlinear contract is high: see, for example,
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) as well as Ferrall and Shearer (1999).
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to the worker in the hiring process, the rm may use its pay policy not only to induce
e¤ort but also to shape the quality mix of the newly hired employees, as discussed
in Lazear (1998); the rm also faces a trade-o¤ between the extra revenue generated
by workers who stay and the associated increase in pay that is necessary to make
them stay. The interaction of all these considerations determine the rms pay policy
and the associated turnover is not necessarily low or nonexistent but depends on the
characteristics of the technology, the workforce and the alternative jobs. When the rm
and workers learn about match quality over time, an additional consideration arises.
Depending on how much starting employees know about their match, turnover becomes
the primary channel through which pay incentives a¤ect the quality mix. In the special
case of a common prior, there is no selection at entry, and turnover is the only source
of changes in the quality mix at the workplace.
Similarly, the models in the structural literature on learning about match quality
and turnover do not incorporate e¤ort choice. The dynamic programs in such models are
complicated enough even as they are, since they involve heterogeneity across employees
and a sequence of posterior beliefs. To my knowledge, Miller (1984) is the rst paper
to estimate a model with learning about match quality. Pastorino (2009) considers
a variation of this model that incorporates correlation between ability at one job and
ability at others. Furthermore, Nagypal (2007) applies the method of indirect inference
to distinguish between learning about match quality and learning-by-doing within a
structural setting. More recently, Camargo and Pastorino (2010) estimate a structural
model of career concerns with learning-by-doing. While these models consider selection
and job mobility, they assume away potential problems of moral hazard. Furthermore,
the computational complexity associated with estimating the models usually requires
some strong assumptions about the production technology and the heterogeneity among
workers.
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Here, I propose a simple two-step procedure to estimate a structural model of learn-
ing about match quality, e¤ort choice, and turnover. In the rst step, I estimate a
semi-structural attrition model and recover the stochastic technology up to a constant,
as well as a scaled version of the value of continued employment. Chapter 3 shows that
the rst-step provides consistent estimates of the e¤ect of changes in pay incentives
on e¤ort, while popular alternatives may overestimate the same e¤ect by a factor of
two. I use these estimates in the second step to recover the remaining parameters using
the method of moments. That is, I use an indirect approach to estimate the value
of continued employment without directly solving for the value function. The same
principle underpins the literature starting with Hotz and Miller (1993) and including
the recent works by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2003). Thus, from a methodological point of view, this paper adapts recent
structural estimation methods to the analysis of employment relations in the presence
of Bayesian learning.
The estimates of the model are then used as a basis for counterfactual policy analysis.
My results suggest that rms choose their pay policy for reasons that go beyond e¤ort
choice. Most of the increase in prots from switching to the optimal policy from hourly
wage can be traced back to the e¤ect of incentives on the quality mix. The optimal
linear contract induces low quality employees to quit and in this way it helps the rm
build a workforce of high match quality over time. This e¤ect more than o¤sets the
loss associated with replacing an experienced worker with a newly hired one of no
experience and unknown ability. Furthermore, the employer exploits the rm-specic
nature of match quality to capture most of the surplus generated by the employment
relation. To achieve that, the rm o¤ers pay incentives that induces little e¤ort, so high
level of e¤ort and low turnover are not necessarily attributes of the prot-maximizing
pay policy. Finally, the optimal policy that I nd generates only 4.8% higher prots
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than one of the actually implemented pay regimes. An exercise in comparative statics
shows that as turnover costs grow, the rm increases compensation to induce lower
turnover by o¤ering much steeper incentives. The result is a decline in the quality mix
of the workforce and an increase in the importance of e¤ort to the rms prots. Given
the strong evidence of high turnover costs in some industries, this nding cautions that
models of job mobility, such as Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Ho¤mann (2010), should
incorporate turnover costs. Finally, another counterfactual experiment shows that the
rms prots would have been 27% higher if match quality was known to the employees
at the time of hiring. The primary reason is that workers of high match quality self-
select into the rm which leads to low turnover and high level of experience.
The results indicate that incentives matter and in this way they are consistent with
the literature devoted to investigating incentive e¤ects represented by Paarsch and
Shearer (2000), Lazear (2000) and Shearer (2004). More specically, they show that
workers are very responsive to changes in the slope of incentives. This is consistent with
previous results obtained in Paarsch and Shearer (1999, 2009), as well as Haley (2003).
The novelty, relative to Shearer and Paarsch (2009), is that optimal pay incentives are
allowed to a¤ect not only e¤ort choice but also the composition of the workforce at
di¤erent tenure horizons. Thus, the chapter extends the work in Lazear (1998, 2000)
on the e¤ect of incentives on the quality mix by studying how turnover shapes the
properties of the optimal pay policy. In particular, the results show that turnover
may be the primary channel through which pay incentives a¤ect prots when workers
learn about match quality on the job. The results also indicate that the considerable
contribution of improved match quality to workers compensation that is estimated in
some structural papers of job mobility, such as Ho¤mann (2010), may depend on the
strong assumptions of low or non-existent turnover costs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model and
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section 4.3 the data. Section 4.4 introduces the estimation of the model. Section 4.5
discusses the estimates of the structural parameters and presents the policy analysis.
Section 4.6 presents some counteractual experiments and Section 4.7 concludes with an
overview of future research.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Workers Problem
The model is a variation of the classical model in Jovanovic (1979) which in addition to
match quality also includes e¤ort choice. The crucial parameter in the model is match
quality i; i 2 R: Match quality is time-invariant, independent and identically distrib-
uted across workers i; and normally distributed, i  N (; 2) ; with a probability
density function denoted as f. At the beginning of each period the worker decides
whether to stay or quit by comparing the value of continued employment and the re-











, independent and identically distributed across tenure horizons t
and i; where t = 1; 2; :::, independent from i; and has a probability density function
denoted f : If the worker stays, she observes a noisy performance signal yit: The noise
in the performance signal "it, "it 2 R; is continuous, independent and identically distrib-
uted across tenure horizons t and workers i; independent from i; normally distributed,
"it  N (0; 2") ; and has a probability density function denoted as f": The performance
signal yit is generated by the following technology2:
yit = i + g (t) + lit + "it
2Since both the actual and estimated performance are always greater that 0, the restriction yit  0
never binds.
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where g; g (t) 2 R+; represents the accumulation of rm-specic knowledge or expe-
rience and lit is e¤ort, lit 2 L  R+, where L is compact. g (t) is increasing and
continuous. Chapters 1 and 2 provide evidence in support of the choice of this additive
functional form for the technology. The worker is paid wit = it+ityit; according to a
linear compensation regime Rit = (it; it)
0 ; where it > 0 and it > 0: Regime Rit is
said to be more generous than regime R0it , Rit > R
0
it; if both it > 
0
it and it > 
0
it:
The worker does not expect the compensation regime to change in the future. The
VNM utility of worker i is:







This specication for the disutility of labor is popular in the related literature; for
example it is used in Shearer (2004) and Paarsch and Shearer (2009). Here  is the
elasticity of e¤ort to its return. Since i and lt enter additively in the utility function,
posterior beliefs do not depend on e¤ort and optimal e¤ort choice does not depend on






Intuitively, this assumption about the functional form of the utility implies that condi-
tional on ones ability, output is proportionate to  :
The belief at the beginning of t is denoted as it and is formed in a Bayesian way.
Let the initial prior be i1 and suppose that employees share a common prior at the time
of hiring - the distribution of match quality in the population of potential employees,
i1  N (; 2) : Given the normality assumptions from above, the posterior belief it
is normally distributed for all t > 1; it  N (it; 2t ) ; where
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2 (t  1) + 2"
Kt =
2
2 (t  1) + 2"
Note that precision of beliefs depends only on t, so the average of the demeaned past
signals is a su¢ cient statistic to characterize posterior beliefs. The posterior mean can
be rewritten as






(yik   l (Rik)  g (k))
!
+ (1  k (t))




: Then, the expected utility from working in period t is
















By these observations, the independence of i from "it and 

it; and by the additivity
of "it in the stochastic technology, the optimal problem of the worker can be formulated
as functional equation (P)
v (it; Rit; t) =
Z




















is the conditional density of it+1; given it and t.
Proposition 1. Given the specication of the model above
112
i. The functional equation (P) has a unique continuous solution V (it; Rit; t) and
the optimal policy
A (it; Rit; t) = flt 2 L j (P ) holds.g
is a continuous function.
ii. Optimal e¤ort l(Rit) > l (R0it) if Rit > R
0
it:
iii. V (it; Rit; t) > V (it; Rit; t) if Rit > R
0
it; and V (it; Rit; t) increases it.
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix A. Let





it+1; Rit; t+ 1
g'  it+1jit; t f  it+1 dit+1dit+1
After the realization of the outside o¤er, i decides to stay if the value of continued
employment is higher than the value of the outside o¤er
H (it; Rit; t)  it > 0:
4.2.2 Firms Problem
Based on the rms records, I take the revenue from a successfully processed call to
be r = $8:5. This approximation is based on the rm records for average outbound
and inbound calls, the reward that the rm receives from processing each type of calls,
and the relation between the number of processed calls and accounts serviced by the
company.4 I consider only contracts R (; ) that are linear in the performance signal:
4The actual contract between the call center and the cable TV company was stated in more com-
plicated terms. The cable TV company transfered accounts to the call center after the latter had
successfully processed previously transfered calls. Thus, the call center made its prots from success-
fully processing accounts; the cable TV company expected more than 95% rate of collection. Yet,
the contract recognized that not all attempts to contact a cable TV subscriber are successful, so it
conditioned pay per account on the inbound and outbound calls that operators make to the client.
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compensation wit is equal to a base pay  plus a bonus proportionate to performance:
wit =  + yit: I assume that inbound and outbound calls, as well as the number of
processed calls per account is independent from the implemented contract. Further-
more, I assume that the rms monthly discount factor is e = 0:99, implying an annual
discount factor of just below 0.9. Quitting disrupts the production process and necessi-
tates spending money to advertise the available job position, and train the replacement.
In what follows, I incorporate turnover costs, which according to some estimates of the
rm itself amount to approximately $750. Furthermore, I also allow the rm to hire
a replacement immediately after a worker quits. The rm is assumed to face constant
returns to scale. Finally, the prot function that I consider below abstracts away from
xed costs.
Given these assumptions, the expected prots per employee in period t, conditional
on staying, match quality, t; and the pay policy, are dened as
it (i; R; t) = (r   ) : (i + l(R) + g (t))  ;
where r is the revenue per call. Let the probability of staying at least until period t be
pit
 
R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1










R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1

( (R)  c)]g:
The expectation operator E indicates that the expectation is taken with respect to the
initial prior belief, which coincides with the distribution of match quality in the popula-
Nevertheless, the underlying factor that drives prots is the successful collection of debt because that
leads to the transfer of more accounts. The approximation establishes a relation between the processed
calls and serviced accounts.
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tion. Each period, the employee either stays with probability pit
 
R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1

and generates prots it (i; R; t) or quits and the rm hires a new employee who at
entry is expected to generate exactly the same prots as the original employee,  (R).





et 1pit  R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1 it (i; R; t)   1  pit  R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1 c
1 P1t=1 t 1  1  pit  R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1
)







The probability of staying pit
 
R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1

and the optimal e¤ort conditions
connect the rms problem to that of the worker presented above.
4.3 Data
The data set contains a clean performance measure and three known compensation
regimes that were implemented in a way that allows to identify each ones e¤ect on
performance. The data comes from a call center in North Carolina owned and operated
by a multinational company. The call center collects outstanding debt and fees on
behalf of cable TV companies, which ensures a stable demand for its services. An
automated switchboard operator allocates inbound and outbound calls, so that the
longest weighting customer is matched with the longest weighting operator. Employees
rotate their work stations on a daily basis.
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As part of a reorganization plan, the central management implemented a linear con-
tract at the beginning of January 2005: a linear function of the performance metric, ,
the number of calls per hour that end with collection of the outstanding debt. Before
January 2005, compensation was based on an hourly wage of $9.5. The central man-
agement was concerned that the company was paying "too much," so it implemented a
new regime for the newly-hired employees in June 2005 (regime 2). Relative to regime
1, regime 2 o¤ered a lower base pay, decreased the slope of the piece rate for those with
performance less than 3.8, and increased the slope of the piece rate for those with per-
formance greater than 3.8 (regime 2). All previously hired employees continued to be
paid according to regime 1. Since the central management was worried about possible
negative e¤ects of the piece rate on the quality of service, it changed the pay regime yet
again in November 2005. The new regime 3 had two components: all employees were
paid according to the pay schedule of regime 2, but in addition employees had to meet
certain minimum quality standards of service to qualify for the piece rate. Twenty per
cent of ones calls were randomly monitored and the quality of service was rated on a
scale from 0 to 100. An employee who did not meet the minimum quality standard
was relegated to an hourly wage equal to the base pay of the piece rate. Since 99% of
performance lies between 1.05 and 3.8, regimes 2 and 3 e¤ectively lowered incentives
relative to regime 1. Diagram 1 shows a time line for the implementation of the three
regimes.
Chapter 2 provides a detailed descriptive analysis. What follows summarizes only
the most relevant pieces of this analysis. The call center experienced high turnover rates
under all pay regimes: more than 50% of all employees under regime 1 quit within the
rst six months of employment, while under regimes 2 and 3 the turnover for the rst
six months approached 67%. There also appears to be a noisy downward trend in the
separation rates as tenure increases. This noisiness is probably due to the small sample
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size, but it also suggests that separation decisions depend to a large extent on individual-
specic factors. Table 1 reports the average performance for the rst six months of
employment across regimes. Again, as one may expect, the average performance under
regime 1 is higher than its counterparts for regimes 2 and 3. Furthermore, the average
performance on the subset of stayers is higher than the simple average, suggesting
that poor performers quit. This evidence suggests that steep pay incentives lead to
high performance; that attrition appears to be non-random, since workers with higher
performance are more likely to stay; that individual-specic e¤ects are present; and
nally that workers accumulate experience or knowledge in the course of their rst six
months of employment.
4.4 Estimation
Moral hazard, learning about match quality and labor mobility have been studied inten-
sively but separately in the structural literature. Still, moral hazard and labor turnover
are dening features of the analytical environment at most workplaces; their interaction
shapes employment outcomes and through them prots and individual welfare. The
estimation of a structural model including all these components is, however, a com-
plicated exercise. The dynamic programs in models with Bayesian learning are quite
complicated, since they involve posterior beliefs about an unobserved individual-specic
parameter. As a result, estimation methods that rely on solving for the value function
at each step of the optimization algorithm are computationally intensive.5
Here, I propose a simple two-step procedure to estimate the structural model in-
corporating e¤ort choice, learning about match quality, and separation decisions. In
5See Nagypal (2007) for an application of indirect inference to the estimation of a model of learning
about match quality. Smith (2003) provides a summary of the econometric challenges associated
with the use of indirect inference to descrete choice problems and outlines a smoothing approach that
addresses them.
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principle, the structural parameters can be recovered by estimating the following model
yit = i + l (Rit) + g (t) + "it
sik = 1 [H (ik; Rit; k)  ik > 0] ;
where yit, t > 1; is observed if sik = 1 for all k = 1; :::; t:6 Doing so, however, involves
solving for the value function of each individual for each belief at each step of the
optimization algorithm, which is computationally intensive. Therefore, in practice I
estimate the model in two steps. In the rst step, I estimate a semi-structural attrition
model and recover the stochastic technology up to a constant, as well as a scaled version
of the value of continued employment. I use these estimates in the second step to recover
the remaining structural parameters using the method of moments. The main advantage
of this two-step estimator is its computational simplicity, but it has also one important
limitation. The initial exible approximation of the value of continued employment can
be imprecise in small samples and this can generate a nite sample bias. One way to
investigate the magnitude of the potential problem and limit its e¤ect is to apply a
K-step procedure as presented in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). This issue is left for
future research. Once the structural parameters are recovered, I use simulation methods
to evaluate the protability of the implemented regimes and to nd the optimal linear
contract. The simulation method and the optimization algorithm are discussed in the
last subsection.
6This is the approach taken in the literature on labor mobility, starting with Keane and Wolpin
(1997).
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4.4.1 Workers Problem: Step 1
The rst step is based on the same estimation method used in Chapter 3. Recall that
I estimate the following semi-structural model:
yit = i + l (Rit) + g (t) + "it
sik = 1 [G (ik; Rit; k)  ik > 0] ;
where yit, t > 1; is observed if sik = 1 for all k = 1; :::; t; it  N (0; 1) ; and
G (ik; Rik; k) =
1

(H (ik; Rit; k)  )
for all t: Moreover, G (ik; Rik; k) is approximated using a linear combination of orthog-
onal polynomials of the explanatory variables; 7 I assume that the following condition
holds for the approximation bG (it; Rit; t) :
E
 bG (it; Rit; t)  1H (it; Rit; t)  

= 0
This model incorporates the restrictions on the stochastic technology, but imposes no
structure on the utility function. As a result, it does not impose a link between e¤ort in
the performance equation and disutility of e¤ort in the attrition equation: By estimating
the semi-structural model, I recover the stochastic technology up to a constant and
G (it; Rit; t) up to a scaling parameter and an additive constant: I estimate the model
using maximum likelihood as discussed in Appendix B. Here I provide a short summary
7Bellman, Kaleba, and Kotkin (1963) rst propose the use of such a linear approximation to
the value function. The approximation method remains popular in both economics and machine
learning, where it is still the workhorse for approximating dynamic programs as discussed in Kveton
and Hauskrecht (2004).
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of the estimation method.
Let the observable information about individual i be Wi and 1 be the vector of
parameters to be estimated conditional on i. The likelihood for individual i conditional









yit   g (t)  l(Rit)  i


 (G (Rit; t; it))
Sit#




sik and Ti is the last period in which i is observed. Since i is not




where 2 is a vector of parameters that dene the distribution of i and  is a vector
that contains all parameters in 1 and 2 : Finally, the log-likelihood is obtained by









These estimates are used in the second step to obtain the remaining structural para-
meters: the marginal disutility of one unit of e¤ort ; the curvature of the disutility
of e¤ort  ; and the mean and variance of the outside o¤er;  and 
2
 ; as well as the
discount factor .
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4.4.2 Workers Problem: Step 2







 1    2






 1    2

for  in terms of  and bl; let the solution be   ;bl and substitute the solution in
the expression for the disutility of labor to obtain U

it; Rit; t;bl;   :
To save on notation, dene
 (G (it; Rit; t))
= Emax fit; G (it; R; t)g
= G (it; Rit; t) : (G (it; Rit; t)) + ' (G (it; Rit; t))
Note that V (it; R; t) can be expressed in terms of G (it; Rit; t) as follows
V (it; Rit; t) = E max fit; H (it; Rit; t)g
=  + Emax fit; G (it; R; t)g
=  +  [ (G (it; Rit; t))]
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From the denition of H (it; Rit; t) and the above representation of V (it; Rit; t) ;
H (it; Rit; t) =  + G (it; Rit; t)






it+1; Rit; t+ 1

where Eit+1 indicates that expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of the
mean of the posterior beliefs in t + 1 given the information available at t; 2t and it:
Consequently,
 + G (it; Rit; t) = U(it; Rit; t; ;  )) + 

 + Eit+1( (G (it; Rit; t+ 1))

By this identity and the assumptions on the approximation of G (it; Rit; t) ; the delta
method implies the following conditions for t = 1; :::; Ti
E
 bG (it; Rit; t) Mit (it; Rit; t;2) = 0;
where








bl;  +  h + Eit+1( bG  it+1; Rit; t+ 1i  o ;
and 2 =
 
 ; ;  ; ;

is the vector of structural parameters recovered at the second







Mit (it; R; t;2) and bGt =X
i
bG (it; R; t)
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where the summation is over the individuals who make the decision to stay or quit in
























 1  bG M (2) ;
where 
 is the optimal weighing matrix. Under the specied model ;  ; ;  ;  are
identied; identication is discussed in Appendix C.
Let the covariance matrix of the structural parameters 1 estimated in the rst step
be : By the Delta method

 = W 0W
where W = @G
@1
. Finally, the covariance matrix  is obtained from the rst-step MLE
estimates. Then, following Hansen (1982), the asymptotic covariance matrix for 2 is
(J 0
 1J) 1, where J = @M
@2
.
Note that the estimation of the structural parameters 2 is in its essence a consis-
tency check for the estimates of the rst-step attrition model: the second step can be
interpreted as a search for structural parameters that generate a data process that is
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consistent with the ndings in the rst step. The criterion function evaluated at the
optimum has 2 distribution with 12 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that
the theoretical model is valid.
4.4.3 Firms Problem
For any regime, the probability of staying at tenure t; pit
 
R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1

; cannot
be estimated analytically, so I resort to simulations to evaluate the protability of pay
regimes. For the set of employees who enter the rm, I draw paths of "t and 

t and  to
generate 1000 data sets. Using the point estimates from steps one and two, I generate
the sequence of noisy performance signals and posterior beliefs. The generation of
the separation indicators, sik, requires some care. Given a regime R; I solve for the
value function of each individual for each posterior belief. I assume that conditional
on staying for 2 years employees know the true value of their match quality and the
accumulation of experience has stopped: Then, the workers problem becomes
V (i; R) =
Z
max [it; U(i; R) + V (i; R)] dF ;
where U(i; R) stands for the expected utility after the individual knows her match
quality i, there is no more experience to be gained, and V (i; R) is the value of
continued employment. This problem can be solved as a standard xed-point problem
using value function iteration. The starting value for the iterations is the discounted
sum of expected utility, i.e.




Then, I solve backwards for the utility of continued employment V (it; R; t), using the
appropriate posterior. I use the Gauss-Hermite method with 8 nodes of integration.
This approach to solving for the value function is similar to the one employed in Nagypal
(2007). Comparing the drawn outside o¤ers and the values of continued employment
from above generates the sequence of separation indicators. It should be noted that all
workers eventually quit. For each of the simulated data sets, I nd the expected prots
per entering employee by averaging the discounted some of individual prots for the
duration of stay. To nd the expected prots per workstation, I take into account that
all quits are replaced by new workers who have exactly the same expected prots at
entry as the original cohort. This simulation method is used to estimate the prots of
the rm under the actually implemented regimes and to evaluate the candidates for the
optimal linear contract at each step of the optimization. Given the low dimension of
the optimization problem, I use a version of the simplex algorithm to nd the optimal
linear contract.
4.5 Results
This section presents the results from estimating the structural model and then shows
how they can be used to nd the prot-maximizing pay policy under various assump-
tions about the employment environment. The policy analysis indicates that turnover
is a major channel through which pay incentives a¤ect both performance and prots.
4.5.1 Estimates of Structural Parameters
In this subsection, I present the results from estimating the structural model and char-
acterize the employment environment. The attrition model of the rst step is estimated
using MLE. The results, their econometric implications, and possible alternative spec-
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ications are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. The explanatory variables for
the performance equations include second degree orthogonal polynomials of tenure and
calendar time, dummies for regimes of operation and regimes of hiring, unobserved
match quality, and controls. Specically, regime 2 enters additively as implied by the
theoretical model. Since regime 3 has the same pay schedule as regime 2 but condi-
tions pay on the quality of service, the performance equation incorporates interaction
terms between the tenure polynomials and regime 3. The attrition equations include
orthogonal polynomials interacted with regimes and, depending on the specication, i
or it; controls, calendar time, and regime of hiring. As a preliminary step, I conduct
a specication search for the degrees of the orthogonal polynomials in the performance
and attrition equations. I nd that orthogonal polynomials of degree 2 for the per-
formance equation and orthogonal polynomials of degree 3 for the attrition equations
t the data best. The estimates can be found in Tables 4.1-4.3. They are very similar
to the ones reported in Chapter 3 for the basic attrition model. The main di¤erence
is that some not signicant variables have been omitted, along with the dummies for
regime of hiring. In what follows, I make a brief summary of those results that are
directly related to the second step of estimation and prots. Furthermore, I measure
the contribution of e¤ort, match quality, and experience to performance in terms of
successful calls per hour (just calls per hour for short from now on).
In the rst step, I estimate the distribution of match quality at entry and character-
ize the associated dynamics of learning and turnover. The variance of match quality
is 0.48 and accounts for the greater part of the variance in performance at entry under
regimes 1 and 2. Moreover, it has an important e¤ect on attrition. Figure 4.1 presents
the distribution of match quality at entry and how it changes by the sixth months of
employment. The value of  is on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis represents
the proportion of agents of a certain match quality who are present in the rm at a
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Table 4.1: Estimates for the performance equation in the attrition model
Dependent Variable: Attrition Model
Performance
Explanatory Variable Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.58 0.15
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.61 0.09
regime 2 -0.21 0.07
regime 3 0.13 0.08
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.78 0.13
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.43 0.08
% outbound calls -0.16 0.05
Constant 3.43 0.11
Log-likelihood -3745.73
Notes: The specication also includes calendar time orthogonal polynomials of degree
2 and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and race.
Table 4.2: Estimates for the separation equation in the attrition model
Dependent Variable: Attrition Model
Decision to stay
Explanatory Variable: Coef. S.E.
t; orthog. pol. 1 -0.51 0.17
t; orthog. pol. 2 -0.22 0.08
t; orthog. pol. 3 0.23 0.13
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.41 0.14
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.42 0.11
t: (regime 2) ; orthog. pol. 3 -0.78 1.59
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 1 0.40 0.16
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 2 0.23 0.08
t: (regime 3) ; orthog. pol. 3 -0.03 0.13
avg. % outbound calls in past -0.31 0.09
Constant 0.58 0.10
Log-likelihood -3745.73
Notes: The specication also includes calendar time orthogonal polynomials of degree
2 and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and race.
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Table 4.3: Estimates of parameters related to ability and learning in the attrition model





 ("; ) 0.01 0.04
2 0.48 0.02
it 0.18 0.05
t:it; orthog. pol. 1 0.06 0.03
t:it; orthog. pol. 2 0.02 0.04
t:it; orthog. pol. 3 0.03 0.03
Log-likelihood -3745.73
Notes: The specication also includes calendar time orthogonal polynomials of degree
2 and individual controls: gender, age, marriage status, distance from home, and race.
given tenure horizon. The gure shows that the conditional distribution of  shifts to
the right as tenure increases under both regimes 1 and 2 and only workers with very
high match quality remain employed after six months of work. As expected, the switch
from regime 1 to regime 2 generates an increase in turnover at any tenure horizon.
The variance of the disturbance term in the performance equation is estimated at 0.17
which implies that the signal-to-noise ratio, dened as the ratio of the variance of match
quality over the variance of noise, is approximately 2.6. Consequently, within 6 months
the variance of the posterior beliefs declines to approximately 0.05 and the weight on
the initial belief declines to almost zero.
Furthermore, I recover the technology up to an additive constant. The estimated
parameters for the performance equation are broadly consistent with the theoretical
predictions. In economic terms, the switch from regime 1 to regime 2 leads to a decline
in workers e¤ort and in turn performance by about 0.2 calls per hour which translates
into a decline in hourly pay by approximately $2. The estimates imply a signicant im-
provement in performance over time due to the accumulation of experience: in the rst
6 months of employment performance increases by approximately one successful call
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per hour, or 35% growth in the rst six months under regime 1. Under regime 1, this
growth translates in an increase in hourly pay by approximately $3.3. Finally, I also esti-
mate exibly the normalized and scaled value of continued employment G (it; R; t;Xit)
which provides the basis for the second step estimation.
Table 4.4 presents the estimates from the second step. Before discussing the results
from the second step, I rst check the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. The -
square test with 12 degrees of freedom for the overidentifying restrictions fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid, since the test statistic is 5.16. Thus, I
conclude that the data is consistent with the restrictions imposed by the model. 8 The
second step results allow for the characterization of optimal e¤ort choice under regimes
1 and 2. The elasticity of e¤ort to pay incentives  is estimated at 3.27 with a standard
error of 0.28, implying that workerssupply of e¤ort is highly sensitive to changes in
pay incentives. The relative benet of e¤ort to its subjective cost represented by  is
estimated at 3.9 with a standard error of 0.3, so that e¤ort amounting to one call per
hour costs to the individual $3.9. Given the estimates of  and  ; the level of e¤ort
under regime 1 translates into an increase in performance by 0.59 calls per hour and
under regime 2 by 0.39 calls per hour. Compared to the variation in match quality,
the contribution of e¤ort to performance is relatively small: less than one standard
deviation under regime 1 and even less under regime 2. In contrast, the mean of match
quality in the population of entering workers is approximately 2, i.e. independent of
pay incentives an employee of average quality successfully completes two calls per hour
when starting work. Furthermore, the results indicate that in the absence of selection at
8Note that the estimation of the structural parameters 2 is a test for consistency of
the rst-step estimates with the specied utility in the model.
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Table 4.4: Estimates of the structural parameters of the model.








experience by t = 6 0.99 0.09
2 0.48 0.02
 2.02 0.11
212 test stat. 5.06
entry and exit the optimal piece rate involves  = 6:559. The fact that the implemented
pay regimes have  much lower suggests that turnover has a nontrivial e¤ect on prots.
The monthly discount factor is estimated at 0.75 with standard error of 0.08, indi-
cating a strong preference for present to future consumption: when making decisions
workers assign a weight 0.001 to consumption after two years. The mean of the dis-
tribution of outside options is $45.6 with a standard error of 2.46, where an outside
option stands for the present value of hourly compensation at an alternative job. The
variance of outside o¤ers is estimated at $32.5. To give some perspective, a job with
an hourly wage of $11.25 has a present value of $45, assuming that the worker has no
right to leave after entry. From these characteristics of the distribution of outside o¤ers
one may guess that the workers may nd alternative employment at low-skill service
jobs or low-skill manufacturing jobs whose hourly wage varies between $8 and $14.





where p is the revenue generated from the employment relation and in the present context is $8.5 per
call. Substituting the estimated  gives  = 6:55
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4.5.2 Prots and Policy Analysis
The estimates of the structural model provide the basis for counterfactual policy analy-
sis. In this subsection, I start by discussing the protability of the implemented regimes
1 and 2, as well as the contribution of e¤ort, experience, and match quality to prots
under these regimes. Then, I consider the problem of maximizing the prots of the
rm. I compare the results to those previously presented for regimes 1 and 2. Finally,
I consider some counterfactual changes in the rm environment and their e¤ect on
prots. In particular, I consider a higher level of turnover costs than the one reported
by the rm. I also evaluate the implications for prots and the optimal compensation
policy when workers learn about their match quality before deciding whether to enter
the rm.
The decomposition of prots is di¢ cult because prots depend on both performance
and the probability of staying, while the latter is a highly nonlinear function of e¤ort,
beliefs about match quality and experience. I approach the problem in the following
way. The additive structure of the technology allows for isolating the contribution of
e¤ort, ability, and experience to prots. I dene
 (R) = E
( 1X
t=1










R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1

1 P1t=1 t 1  1  pit  R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1
to be the prots associated with match quality. In a similar way,
l (R) = E
( 1X
t=1
et 1Pit  R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1 (r   ) l (R)
)
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t (R) = E
( 1X
t=1
et 1Pit  R; i; t; f"ik; ikgt 1k=1 (r   ) g (t)
)
l (R) and t (R) stand for the contribution to prots by e¤ort and with experience,
respectively. I take hourly wage as a benchmark regime with respect to which I evaluate
how total prots and the contributions of e¤ort, experience and match quality dened
above change as the pay regime changes. An alternative approach that I also apply
to the study of the e¤ect of e¤ort on prots is to compare prots under the same pay
regime when e¤ort a¤ects performance and stay and when it is restricted to have no
e¤ect on them: the di¤erence in the prots provides a conservative estimate for the
contribution of e¤ort to prots.
Implemented Regimes
Table 4.5 presents the pay policies that I analyze, along with prots,10 e¤ort, average
match quality and average tenure per workstation under each of them. Table 4.6 con-
siders the channels through which pay incentives a¤ect prots. It considers the e¤ects
on the contributions of e¤ort, match quality, and tenure to prots when switching from
the initial hourly wage to some alternative pay regimes. Under an hourly wage, em-
ployees do not exert e¤ort. Moreover, equal hourly pay implies that workers of di¤erent
match quality are equally likely to quit at any tenure horizon. I x the hourly wage to
$9.5 which was actually implemented by the rm prior to January 2005. This hourly
wage is clearly quite low relative to the mean of the outside o¤er and leads to a very
high turnover: more than 93% of the employees last at most six months in the rm.
This high turnover leads to a low level of experience in the workforce as indicated by
an average tenure of 3.23. Furthermore, the failure of the hourly wage to distinguish
10Recall that from the denition of prots, total prots stands for the discounted innite sum of
hourly prots starting from the month of hiring the worker.
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between workers of high and low match quality leads to an average match quality of
1.99 calls per hour. Taken together, these e¤ects of the hourly wage lead to total prots
of $19.4.11
Switching from the hourly wage to regime 1 induces all workers to exert e¤ort of
0.58 calls per hour but also rewards workers of high match quality more than workers of
low match quality. As discussed in Chapter 3, the result is that workers of high match
quality stay longer in the rm than workers of low match quality. These di¤erences
lead to an increase in average match quality to 2.88 calls per hour. The net e¤ect
of the change in the compensation policy on the separation decisions is a decline in
turnover illustrated with an increase in average tenure to 11.2 months. The retention
of employees of high match quality, along with the decline in their probability of quitting
at any tenure horizon leads to an impressive increase in  by $90. The lower turnover
also leads to an increase in the prots associated with experience by approximately
$49. Finally, the introduction of the bonus rate of $3.3 per successful call induces e¤ort
that generates prots associated with e¤ort in the amount of $31.42.12 Total prots
jump to $167. These numbers indicate that the increase in ; followed by the increase
in t; rather than the increase in l makes the greatest contribution to the increase in
prots when switching from hourly wage to regime 1. The results suggest that the rm
benets considerably from the accumulation of workers of high match quality through
turnover.
Next, I consider the e¤ect of regime 2 on prots. Recall that this regime stipulates
both lower base pay and lower piece rate. This less generous compensation policy
leads to a sharp increase in the probability of quitting during the rst six months
11Under the given specication of the stochastic technology and the utility, the prots associated
with match quality  are $28.89 and the prots associated with experience t are $10.4.
12Recall that the rm incurs a at hourly pay of  and turnover costs which must be subtracted to
obtain the total prots.
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which approaches the levels under the hourly wage. The result is average tenure of
6.2 months, a decrease by more than 40% relative to regime 1, which implies also
lower levels of accumulated experience. While the probability of quitting increases
at each tenure horizon, the rm still retains workers of very high match quality, as
discussed in Chapter 3. However, average match quality under regime 2 is not higher
but slightly lower than average match quality under regime 1: 2.82 calls per hour. This
result indicates that the negative e¤ect of high turnover more than o¤sets the e¤ect of
retaining only the workers of highest match quality. At the same time, e¤ort declines
to 0.34 calls per hour. The combined e¤ect of these factors implies that regime 2 yields
much lower prots than regime 1. Despite the fact that the piece rate declines by $0.8
calls per hour, the prots associated with match quality are still $70 higher compared
to their level under the hourly wage. However, as a result of the high rate of destruction
of accumulated experience, t is quite close to its level under the hourly wage: it is
only $16 higher. The prots associated with e¤ort l are approximately $10, and total
prots amount to about $110. Thus, under regime 2 match quality continues to be
a crucial determinant of prots and the decline relative to regime 1 is smallest in the
case of :
Optimal Regime
The solution of the prot-maximization problem is the optimal pay regime Rw dened
by w = 3:64 and w = 3:26: Several factors a¤ect its properties. While steep incentives
induce more e¤ort and increase the probability of staying, they also surrender a larger
proportion of the revenues to the employees. Since quitting of an employee comes with
the possibility of hiring a better one in the future, the rm chooses a pay schedule that
among other things, balances the benet from continued employment of a worker and
the benet from nding one of higher quality. The results here depend crucially on the
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Figure 4.1: Ability under regime 1, 2, and the optimal regimes when the turnover cost
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rm-specic nature of the match quality parameter: in particular, the ability of the rm
to extract much of the surplus from the employment relation will be limited if workers
can export their match quality  to alternative jobs. The ndings also depend to some
extend on the simple nature of the compensation policy: for example, the properties of
the optimal pay regime will change if the rm can condition base pay  on posterior
beliefs about match quality.
The slope and base pay of the optimal pay regime Rw are very close to those im-
plemented under regime 1. The optimal pay regime Rw induces considerable turnover:
only about 55% of the employees stay more than six months in the rm. Furthermore, it
not only induces a similar rate of turnover but also leads to a similar quality mix at dif-
ferent tenure horizons as regime 1. Figure 4.1 shows that the conditional distributions
of match quality after six months under regime 1 and regime Rw are almost identical.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison between prots under regime 1, the optimal regime when
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It also indicates that only workers of high match quality (match quality greater than
 + ) experience little or no turnover. The small slope of incentives induces e¤ort
that translates into only 0.55 calls per hour, less than one standard deviation of match
quality among starting employees. The distributions of expected prots under the
optimal pay regime Rw and regime 1 are again very similar but some di¤erences are
also present, as evident from Figure 4.2. Regime 1 generates more income on employees
of average quality while regime Rw generates more prots on the top performers. This
pattern is explained by the fact that under regime Rw the rm captures more of the
surplus from the top performers while the slightly higher slope of incentives and base
pay under regime 1 induce more workers of average ability to stay and work. The net
e¤ect is that optimal pay regime Rw generates approximately 4.8% higher prots than
regime 1.
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Table 4.5: Prots, e¤ort, ability and tenure per workstation under di¤erent regimes.
Pay policy:   l E (t) E () 
hourly wage, w 9.5 0 0 3.23 1.99 19.41
regime 1 3.8 3.3 0.58 11.22 2.86 167.72
regime 2 3.5 2.8 0.34 6.23 2.82 109.81
regime Rw 3.65 3.24 0.55 9.85 2.91 174.24
regime Rw , known ability 3.65 3.24 0.55 12.30 3.12 215.92
regime Rn; known ability 3.74 3.09 0.47 11.61 3.17 221.74
regime Rh; high costs 1.82 5.44 2.91 19.12 2.17 162.30
Relative to regime 1, the optimal regime is less generous which leads to a small
increase in the probability of quitting across posterior beliefs and tenure horizons. The
result is average tenure of about 10 months, slightly lower than the 11.2 months under
regime 1. This nding implies that the level of accumulated experience under the
optimal regime Rw is just below that for regime 1. The probability of quitting increases
at each tenure horizon relative to regime 1, but the rm still retains workers of very
high match quality, as discussed in the previous paragraph in the context of Figure
4.2. The net e¤ect is that the average match quality under Rw is 2.91 calls per hour,
slightly higher than its counterpart for regime 1 which leads also to higher prots.
Furthermore, shaving o¤ 6 cents from the bonus rate reduces e¤ort only to 0.55 calls
per hour relative to the 0.58 call per hour under regime 1. Due to the improved quality
mix, the small negative e¤ect on turnover, and the small reduction in the variable
costs, the contribution of match quality to prots, ; increases by $99 relative to its
level under hourly wage. The contribution of tenure to prots, t; increases by $44
when switching from hourly wage to regime Rw: The contribution of e¤ort, l; declines
slightly relative to regime 1 to $31. Combining all of these with the costs of turnover
and base pay yields total prots of $174. The results show that switching from the
benchmark hourly wage to the optimal regime Rw leads to an increase in prots by
more than eight times, or in absolute terms by $154. The results show that much of
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Table 4.6: E¤ects of di¤erent pay regimes relative to hourly wage.
Pay policy:   l t 
regime 1 3.8 3.3 35.06 49.14 89.85
regime 2 3.5 2.8 9.74 15.68 70.33
regime Rw 3.65 3.24 31.42 99.32 99.32
regime Rw, known ability 3.65 3.24 33.31 49.93 131.18
regime Rn; known ability 3.74 3.09 29.18 48.37 140.57
regime Rh, high costs 1.82 5.44 191.04 56.20 23.42
Note: x = x (R)  x (w) ; x = l; t; :
this change is due to the e¤ect of incentives on the quality mix of the workforce rather
than the e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort.
An alternative approach to evaluate the e¤ect of incentives on prots through e¤ort
is to compare prots under the optimal pay regime when e¤ort a¤ects performance
and stay and when it is restricted to have no e¤ect on them. My analysis starts with
the quality mix, assuming that e¤ort is not a channel through which incentives a¤ect
performance or separation decisions: Figure 4.3 shows that under the hourly wage of
$9.5, implemented until January 2005, the rm makes losses on some workers of below
average ability and its expected prots amount only to approximately $20, due to a high
quitting rate and the associated costs. The gure also indicates that the introduction of
the optimal regime induces high quality employees to stay while low quality employees
to quit. The rm captures 75 % of the additional surplus and prots increase by more
than a factor of three.
Next, I relax the restriction that incentives do not a¤ect e¤ort, but still maintain that
e¤ort choice has not e¤ect on separation decisions. Figure 4.3 shows that the exerted
e¤ort leads to an additional increase in prots by 114%. Finally, I also allow e¤ort choice
to a¤ect separation decisions, but Figure 4.3 indicates that only but a few separation
decisions remain unchanged: the combined e¤ect of e¤ort choice and match quality
for those who switch from quitting to staying accounts for a 19% increase in prots.
Thus, the total e¤ect of switching from hourly wage to the benchmark rate results in
138








-4.20 -3.40 -2.60 -1.80 -1.00 -0.20 0.60 1.40 2.20 3.00 3.80 4.60
Match quality (in std. dev. of match quality)
$/
hr
Profits when effort does not affect perf. and stay.
Optimal profits when turnover cost is $750.
Profits when effort affects perf. but not stay.
Profits  under hourly wage of $9.5
Figure 4.4: Comparison between prots under regime 1, the optimal regime when
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a dramatic increase in prots, but two-thirds of the increase would have materialized
even if pay incentives did not a¤ect e¤ort choice or the separation decisions.
To summarize, these results show that most of the increase in prots from switching
to the optimal pay regime can be traced back to the e¤ect of incentives on the quality
mix. Pay incentives not only induce high quality employees to stay but also act as a
selection mechanism that helps the rm build a workforce of high match quality over
time. In the present context, the rm exploits the rm-specic nature of the relation
to capture most of the surplus generated by the employment relation.
4.6 Counterfactual Experiments
The turnover costs of $750 reported by the rm appear very low relative to industry
averages published in Superb Sta¤ Services (2011) which vary between $4,100 and
$25,000. In this subsection, I explore the e¤ect of high turnover costs on prots under
the regime Rw, optimal under a turnover cost of $750, and search for the optimal regime
under turnover costs equal to the industry average of $8,800. Furthermore, I study the
e¤ect on prots when the worker knows her match quality before deciding to start
working but the employer does not.
4.6.1 Turnover Costs
The optimal pay regime Rh when turnover costs are $8,800 is dened by h = 1:55 and
h = 5:42: These slope and base pay are much di¤erent from the ones implemented
by the rm. The high-powered incentives induce little turnover, mainly in the rst two
months of employment, and a high level of e¤ort resulting in 2.91 calls per hour. Figure
4.4 presents prots under regimes 1, Rw and Rh when turnover costs are $8,800. A com-
parison of prots under pay regime Rh and regime Rw reveals that the two have a very
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similar expected prots from the top performers, while regime Rh accumulates much
higher prots on the employees of low and average quality. Thus, the top performers
capture much of the revenue under regime Rh, while the rm increases its prots from
the higher e¤ort exerted by employees who would not have stayed under regimes 1 or
Rw. Table 4.5 shows that the low turnover rate leads not only to a high average tenure
of about 20 months but also to a low average match quality of 2.17 calls per hour. In
contrast to the case of the optimal contract when turnover cost is only $750, the prots
under optimal regime Rh come mainly from high levels of e¤ort: l for this regime is
$191. Still, total prots are only $162 because of the high turnover costs.
Next, I analyze the composition of prots. I start with the quality mix, assum-
ing that implementing regime Rh does not a¤ect performance or separation decisions
through e¤ort choice. Figure 4.5 shows that the introduction of regime Rh, even in
the absence of any e¤ect through e¤ort choice, allows many employees to remain in the
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rm and in turn generate revenue of which more than 67% go to the workers. Then,
I relax the restriction that incentives do not a¤ect e¤ort but still maintain that e¤ort
is not a channel through which incentives a¤ect separation decisions. Figure 4.5 shows
that, under these new restrictions, pay incentives induce e¤ort that increases revenues
considerably in contrast to the case of the optimal regime when turnover costs are $750.
Finally, I allow e¤ort choice to a¤ect separation decisions. Given the assumptions of
the model about the utility function, the regime induces higher e¤ort and higher utility.
Thus, the introduction of e¤ort choice changes some but not all separation decisions:
some workers who would have otherwise left now decide to stay. The employees who
now stay contribute to prots with their match quality and e¤ort: as evident from
Figure 4.5, the e¤ect is not negligible.
Summing up, the total e¤ect of switching from hourly wage to regime Re results in
an impressive increase in prots, but only 27% of this growth would have materialized
if pay incentives did not a¤ect performance and separation decisions through e¤ort
choice. Thus, this counterfactual experiment indicates the sensitivity of the solution to
the prot maximization problem to turnover costs.
4.6.2 Workers Know the Match Quality
Table 4.5 and 4.6 report average match quality, average tenure, prots, and their
decomposition when workers know their match quality before deciding to join the rm.
When regime Rw, optimal when workers learn their match quality, is implemented
in this environment, prots increase to $216. Much of this increase can be traced
back to self-selection at entry: some workers know that their match with the rm is
of low quality and decide to opt out for an alternative. Figure 4.6 shows the mean of
the distribution of match quality at t = 1 under Rw when workers know their match
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Figure 4.6: Ability at entry under the optimal regimes when workers know match
quality, when they learn about it, and when the latter is applied to an environment in
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quality is 2.35 calls per hour compared to 2.01 calls per hour when they learn about
it. As a result, the rm accumulates workers of high match quality faster than when
workers learn about match quality and the average match quality increases to 3.12 calls
per hour, while the average tenure increases to 12.3 months. These e¤ects lead to a
considerable increase of $141 in  relative to its level under hourly wages, which is
largely responsible for the increase of total prots to $216.
The next step is to nd the optimal pay regime when workers know their match
quality before deciding to enter the rm. This problem is a special case of the more
general model presented above: the prior belief is a degenerate distribution centered
at the true value of match quality. The solution of the prot-maximization problem is
the optimal pay regime Rn dened by n = 3:74 and n = 3:09: The results for this
regime are reported in tables 4.5 and 4.6. The rm o¤ers lower incentives to exert e¤ort
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Figure 4.7: Comparison between prots under the optimal regimes when workers know
match quality at entry, when they learn about it, and when the latter is applied to an
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in order to capture a greater share of the prots associated with match quality which
is partially o¤set by a modest increase in the base pay. Thus, the growth in income
and the variance of the distribution of income in this environment are smaller than
their counterparts when workers learn about match quality. Still, one cannot generalize
too much from this result because the properties of regime Rn depend considerably on
the restriction to search for the optimal regime within the family of linear contracts
only. The average match quality under Rn is 3.17 calls per hour and the distribution of
match quality among the entering employees is not much di¤erent from that under Rw,
as shown on Figure 4.6. Average tenure is 11.6 months, compared to 12.3 months under
Rw, while e¤ort amounts to only 0.47 calls per hour. Total prots are $221. Figure
4.7 presents prots under regime Rn when workers know their match quality, under
regime Rw when workers learn about their match quality, and when they know it. It
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shows that the prots under Rn and Rw when workers know their match quality are
similar. This is driven by the fact that more or less the same type of people enter the
rm under both regimes and all di¤erences arise from the fact that Rn shaves o¤more
of the revenue from top performers by decreasing the bonus rate at the expense of a
slightly higher turnover. Consequently, the results indicate that employers can benet
considerably if they can introduce a technology that helps workers nd out their match
quality before they decide to enter the rm.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter considers a structural model of e¤ort choice, learning about match quality,
and turnover. It shows how such a model can be estimated with a two-step procedure
that borrows ideas from the literature on estimation of dynamic structural models. The
results indicate that employees are very responsive to pay incentives, impatient to post-
pone future consumption, and face a large variety of outside options primarily selected
from low-skill service and manufacturing industries. Workers accumulate experience
during the rst six months on the job which improves performance. Still, variability
in the quality of the employer-employee match accounts for most variation in perfor-
mance across individuals under a given pay regime. The chapter examines a variety
of regimes to nd that the rm maximizes prots by selecting and keeping the high
quality employees, even at the expense of inducing low e¤ort. It also shows that most
gains from switching to the optimal pay regime from an hourly wage can be traced to
the improvement in the match quality of the workforce.
In this chapter, I focused on contracts that are linear in the performance signal, both
for simplicity and because such linear contracts are commonplace. In future work I will
allow for contracts that are nonlinear in the performance signal. Given the presence of
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learning about match quality and the accumulation of experience, it is likely that the
rm would also optimally choose to have the compensation scheme vary with tenure.
Moreover, the optimal compensation schedule may depend on all past performance
signals, possibly through a su¢ cient statistic such as their average. This also calls
for further work. The social surplus per workstation in a given period is the collected
revenue minus disutility denominated in dollars and turnover costs; there is no reason
to expect the prot-maximizing regime to be socially optimal. I plan to characterize
the socially optimal scheme and compare it to the prot-maximizing scheme. Finally,
my approach should allow me to explore possible gender, race, and age di¤erences in
the response to pay incentives, on which there is scant evidence so far.
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4.8 Appendix C
There are 18 moment conditions and 5 parameters to be estimated. The conditions are
nonlinear which complicates identication. By the assumption on the approximation
of G (it; Rit; t), the minimum distance problem has a solution. The following discus-
sion addresses the uniqueness of that solution. The discount factor is identied from
variation in G (it; Rit; t+ 1) with t that is associated with changes in the precision of
beliefs. The results from step 1 show that by t = 12 the accumulation of experience
has come to an end. Therefore, conditional on the information available at t; t > 12;
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Conditional on the information available at t and Rit = Rit+1; variation in G (it; Rit; t)
across periods originates from changes in the precision of posterior beliefs. Therefore,
variation in the rst di¤erences on the left-hand and the right-hand side of the condition
above identies the discount factor.
Given ;  is identied from variation in G (it; Rit; t+ 1) that is associated with
accumulated experience and variation in the means of the posterior beliefs. If Rit =
Rit+1;
U(it+1; Rit; t; ;  )  U(it; Rit; t; ;  ) = 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Therefore, variation in the rst di¤erences of expected utility and in the rst-di¤erence
in the left-hand side in the above condition identies  : with changes in beliefs and
experience when the pay regime does not change variation in H (it; R; t) originates
from the accumulated experience and variation in beliefs, so  is identied from the
ratio of the rst-di¤erence in
H (it; R; t)  Eit+1jit ( (H (it; R; t+ 1))
and the rst-di¤erence in U(it; Rit; t): Given  and  ; the structural parameters 
and  are identied from  = 

 ;bl and from variation in G(it; Rit; t) with t that
is associated with changes in the pay regime. Given ,  ; ;  ; the mean of the outside
o¤er is identied from variation in G(it; Rit; t) and the denition of the VNM utility.
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